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Sarbanes-Oxley compliance obligations reach their tentacles into many aspects of corporate
governance. One discrete, and seemingly-straightforward, aspect of SOX and its Section 301
mandate that audit committees offer "confidential, anonymous employee complaint proce-
dures," colloquially called whistleblower hotlines. The SOX hotline mandate, when complied
with internationally, has spawned an especially intense (and surprisingly intricate) conflict
with labor and data protection laws across the European Union. This article begins with a
close analysis of what SOX Section 301 does, and does not, require as to offering hotlines
outside the United States. The article then addresses the heated social reaction in Europe to
anonymous whistleblower hotlines. The discussion next addresses the conflict between the SOX
hotline mandate and the European labor law concept of employee "information and consulta-
tion." Then, the most detailed section of this article is its explication of the EU data protection
rules that regulate whistleblower hotlines. For the first time anywhere, this article summa-
rizes the written positions of each EU member state data protection authority that has issued
hotline-specific guidance. The article concludes by listing and analyzing each of the five possi-
ble European hotline strategies available to a SOX-regulated multinational employing
Europeans-five strategies also available to non-SOX-regulated multinationals launching
global employee hotlines for reasons of good corporate governance.
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In this first decade of the millennium, the guiding theme for multinational business
operations seems to have become, perhaps, compliance. In the post-Enron world of tough
white-collar crime and environmental-law enforcement, ramped-up data privacy protec-
tions, expanded anti-bribery rules under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) convention, and the ever-keener focus on Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX), corporate social responsibility, and other corporate governance rules, today mul-
tinationals seem to take their legal and ethical responsibilities only one way-seriously.
Among those multinationals listed with U.S. stock exchanges, compliance with SOX
surely tops the legal compliance agenda.' SOX, of course, is a complex statute. It has
been called "a colossal piece of legislation in both size and scope." 2 Its chief ramifications
are broad reforms of accounting norms and securities registrations. Entire books have
been written about how to comply with it.3
Along with all the broad provisions and far-reaching ramifications of SOX, one discrete,
if thin, slice of SOX compliance raises unique problems of international employment law:
the intersection between SOX's mandate for employee "complaint procedures" and Euro-
pean labor and data privacy laws.4 Section 301, a short provision within SOX, requires the
audit committees of listed multinationals to launch "procedures" (commonly called hot-
lines) for the "confidential, anonymous submission" of employee "complaints" or "con-
cerns" regarding "questionable auditing or accounting" matters (commonly called
whistleblowing). 5 This seemingly-simple mandate, as complied with in much of Europe,
1. Actually, SOX reaches all entities, be they U.S.-based or foreign private issuers, that raise funds on U.S.
stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ. As such, this article is
addressed to those U.S. and foreign-based multinationals that raise funds on U.S. stock exchanges and that
employ people in Europe. However, it is a growing best practice among all multinationals (not only those
subject to SOX) to sponsor whistleblower procedures. "Virtually all major U.S. corporations have adopted
company-wide codes of ethics that . . . encourage confidential or anonymous reporting of wrongdoing by
employees..." Michael Starr & Hanno Timner, A Multinational Bind: U.S. Companies Face Legal and Cultural
Clash over Global Codes of Ethics and EU Privacy Policies, 235 N.Y.LJ. 9 (2006). Indeed, increasingly even
European-based corporations and NGOs are launching employee hotlines. To that extent, the discussion in
this article about hotlines in Europe applies to any employer, SOX-regulated or not, that sponsors
whistleblowing procedures in European workplaces.
2. Jason Thompson, The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as It Relates to the Practitioner Repre-
senting a Multinational Corporation, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 265, 266 (2006). It has also been said that
"Sarbanes-Oxley is complex legislation, containing an assortment of features." Mark Hulbert, The Law of
Unintended Consequences?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2007, at B6.
3. E.g., JOHN T. BOS'LEMAN, SARBANEs-OxLEY DESEBOOK (2007); HAROLD S. BLOOMEN-'HAL,
SARBANES-OXLEY AcT IN PERSPECTIVE (2006-07 ed.); Jo-HN" J. HUBER, STANLEY KELLER ET AL., THE
PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE 10 THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT (2006 Supp.); JAMES HAMILTON & TED
TRAuTNmANN, SARBANES-OXLEY MANUAL: A HANDBOOK FOR THE ACT AND S.E.C. RULES (2003).
4. As of the end of 2007, the legal hurdles specific to SOX-style employee whistieblower hotlines seem to
arise only in EU jurisdictions. In theory, non-European jurisdictions with labor laws and data protection
(privacy) laws similar to those in Europe could take positions similar to those of the European jurisdictions
discussed in this article. Argentina, for one, has adopted a data protection law modeled on that of the EU, so
this law could, in theory, raise similar issues. Argentine Personal Data Protection Act 2000, No25.326
(2000), available at www.protecciondedates.com/ar/law25356.htm. Some non-EU Eastern European jurisdic-
tions also have EU-like data protection laws, and Russia has labor and privacy laws that would likely have
significant ramifications for SOX hotlines. But these jurisdictions, as of early 2008, have not issued hotline-
specific regulations. This article, therefore, focuses on those jurisdictions that have issued specific written
guidance on the SOX hotine issue, and to date those jurisdictions are all in the EU. See infra note 252.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 [hereinafter "SOX"], § 301(4)(A), (B) [hereinafter
"§ 301"]. As to the "audit committee" reference in § 301, other sections of SOX require an issuer company
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is far more complex than Americans, such as the drafters of SOX, might ever have pre-
dicted. While the SOX anonymous hotline mandate focuses on the wbistleblower as do-
gooder, specific applications of European labor and data protection laws protect the due
process and presumption of innocence of whistleblowers' targets-the alleged wrongdoers.
These European doctrines, which seem particularly skeptical of the anonymity feature of
SOX whistleblowing, clash with American-style hotlines and to that extent pose a signifi-
cant, if narrowly-confined, challenge for international legal compliance and corporate so-
cial responsibility. Complicating the issue even further is the problem that there is no
single "European" view here. As of early 2008, we had written guidance specifically for
anonymous hotlines from an advisory EU body plus court cases, regulations, and positions
papers from eight EU member states, no two of which took precisely the same position.
In the universe of compliance concerns regarding SOX's auditing and securities rules,
the anonymous-hotlines-in-Europe issue may seem just a blip. But to those responsible
for publicly-traded multinationals' global human resources compliance efforts, this issue
has become particularly vexing. Since the summer of 2005, this sub-issue of SOX law has
loomed as a storm cloud, threatening compliance-focused, SOX-regulated multinationals.
SOX's anonymous hotlines mandate seems irreconcilable with European doctrines. The
Wall Street Journal quoted a lawyer as saying the conflicting laws tell companies, "I have to
either chop off my left hand or my right hand." 6 Between 2006 and 2008, as more mem-
ber states came on board with even more nuanced local positions, the anonymous hotlines
in Europe issue only became more intractable.
Stepping back to the level of common sense policy, for there to be an international
debate over the anonymity feature of employee hotlines might perhaps seem overwrought.
After all, anyone on Earth, employee or not, with access to civilization and a few euros can
mail an anonymous letter, send a fax from an office-services store, transmit an electronic
message from an internet caf6, or dial on a pay phone, to any corporation in complete
anonymity and denounce anyone. 7 From this practical standpoint, perhaps SOX enforcers
need not invest scarce resources forcing companies to build redundant channels for anon-
ymous denunciations. At the same time, and from this same practical standpoint, perhaps
EU member states need not invest scarce resources policing how corporations facilitate
employee communications that all employees are already free and empowered to make on
their own.
This practical observation, unfortunately, does nothing to resolve the actively-raging
legal battle over anonymous SOX whistleblower hotlines in Europe. Winning that battle
requires legal analysis and a carefully-tailored corporate strategy that simultaneously fac-
tors in SOX and the nuanced and differing legal doctrines in the EU member states.
to establish an independent audit committee responsible for overseeing the work of any registered public
accounting firm employed by the issuer. Each accounting firm must report directly to the audit committee.
6. David Reilly & Sarah Nassauer, Tip-Line Bind: Follow the Law in U.S. or EU?, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 6,
2005, at Cl. Others have used different analogies. For example: "'Between the devil and the deep blue sea'
may be the best way to describe the bind faced by American multinational companies as they try to comply
both with U.S.-based pressures to maintain global codes of corporate ethics and with the privacy policies and
philosophies of the European Union." Starr & Timner, supra note 1, at 9. SeeJason Thompson, svpra note 2,
at 280 (in SOX hotline-in-Europe context, a "company may potentially find itself in a position where it is
impossible to comply fully with all laws").
7. For that matter, the World War 1H and communist-era anonymous denunciations that concern some
Europeans (see infra Part If) were made without the help of elaborate, high-tech outsourced hotlines.
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Fortunately, while SOX's anonymous-hotline mandate is not exactly harmonious with
these European legal doctrines, the issues here, for the most part, are largely reconcilable
for those multinationals willing to make a rather significant effort to comply. That is,
there are reconcilable readings of the U.S. and European legal mandates by which a mul-
tinational need not "chop off" either its "left hand [or its] right hand."8 But the reconcili-
ation is not easy. To follow both SOX and the European rules simultaneously, each
multinational needs to craft-and then implement-a creative, company-tailored compli-
ance strategy.
Creating this strategy requires understanding five discrete issues. We will discuss each
of those issues in the five parts of this article: 1) SOX hotline law and its extraterritorial
reach; 2) SOX friction in Europe socially; 3) European labor law on "information and
consultation" with workers representatives; 4) European data protection/privacy laws and
whistleblower hotlines; and 5) five strategy approaches toward a Europe-compliant global
SOX whistleblower hotline
I. SOX Hodine Law and Its Extraterritorial Reach
To understand why SOX hotlines raise tough issues under European law, we must first
understand what SOX does, and does not, require as to anonymous whistleblower hot-
lines, both stateside and abroad. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, of course, is primarily
aimed at corporate accountability; whistleblower hotlines comprise just one slice of this
much more complex legislative package.9 SOX was passed as an effort to root out and kill
corporate fraud; President Bush called the law "the most far-reaching overhaul of the
nation's business practices since the Great Depression." 0 Among the other more com-
plex tools SOX creates for doing this, SOX promotes employee whistleblowing on the
common-sense hypothesis that company insiders are well-positioned to nip corporate
malfeasance in the bud.I" To this end, Section 806 of SOX12 protects whistleblowers from
8. Compare Reilly & Nassauer, supra note 6 (hand-chopping quote) with Starr & Timner, supra note 1
("Yes, Virginia, it is possible to develop a whistleblower program that complies both with SOX and also EU
data-protection law, but it is not easy").
9. See supra note 1 and citations supra note 3.
10. Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms into Law: President Says Era of "False Profits" Is Over, WASH.
POST, July 31, 2002, at A4, as quoted in Kristina A. Sadlak, The European Commission's Action Plan to Modernize
European Company Law: How Far Should the SEC Go in Exempting European Issuers front Complying with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act?, 3 INT'L L. & MGr. REV. 1 (2006). "The primary purpose of [SOX] is to prevent the
type of corruption and crime that marked the downfall of companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur
Andersen." Jason Thompson, supra note 2, at 269.
11. See Ian L. Schaffer, Note, An International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle: When the
Ertraterritorial Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1829, 1841 (2006) ("[t]o
prevent a repeat of Enron-like cases, Congress... incorporated provisions into SOX that were meant to
encourage employees to come forth with information regarding financial and accounting irregularities").
12. SOX, supra note 5, § 806. There are many good scholarly discussions of the SOX § 806 whistleblower
retaliation provisions. See Jonathan Ben-Asher, Developments in Whistlehlower Cases Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, in RETALIATION AND WHISTLEBLOWERS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. 60TH ANNuAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR (forthcoming 2008); see also JOHN T. BosTLEmAN, supra note 3, at §§ 19.1-19.8; MICHAEL DE-
LIKAT, Corporate Whistleblowing in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era (2007); see also citations infra note 29. (For that
matter, there are a number of other laws applicable in U.S. workforces that also prohibit employers from
retaliating against whistleblowers. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (a), (b) (2007)).
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retaliation by SOX-regulated employers. 13 But going further, SOX forces companies to
invite whistleblowers to come forward: SOX Section 301 affirmatively encourages
whistleblowing by requiring the audit committees of SOX-regulated companies to spon-
sor whistleblower hotlines-or at least to institute "procedures" for handling "confiden-
tial, anonymous" "employe[e]" "complaints" and "concerns" about "questionable auditing
or accounting matters." According to the SOX statute (as tracked by similar language in
S.E.C. and stock exchange rules): "Each audit committee shall establish procedures for: (A)
the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding ac-
counting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anony-
mous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or
auditing matters."14
Section 301 is the only provision in SOX, or SOX regulations, that tells companies how
to implement employee (as opposed to "senior financial officer" and attorney' 5)
13. While § 806 gives whistleblowers a cause of action for retaliation, that is not to say that much legiti-
mate whistleblowing is proved to occur in SOX-regulated workplaces. Would-be whistleblowers who have
sued under § 806 have, as of the end of 2007, failed spectacularly.
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which offers corporate whistdeblowers pro-
tection from retaliation, about 1,000 [retaliation] claims have been filed, but only 17 have been
found to have merit, according to U.S. Department of Labor statistics. And of those 17 cases,
only 6 have kept their wins after full hearings before administrative law judges.
Teresa Baldas, Employers Scoring in Whistleblower Actions, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 29, 2007, at 4. There are various
theories as to why only 6 out of 1,000 SOX whistieblower claims would be found to have merit. One of these
theories is that American corporations in the current decade tend to welcome those who point out internal
wrongdoing and rarely discriminate against whistieblowers. Another theory is that the 180-day Administra-
tive LawJudge ("ALJ") hearing deadline is too short. MICHAEL R. TRIPLETT, Unattractive Option: Attorney
Speakers Explain Limitations, BNA DAILY LAB. REr., 220, Nov. 15, 2007, at Cl.
14. SOX § 301(m)(4) (emphasis added). See generally S.E.C. Rule 1OA-3(b)(3) available at www.law.uc.edu/
CCL/34ActRls/rulel0A-03.html; NASDAQ Rule 4350(d)(3), available at http://nasdaq.compliment.com/nas-
daq/display/index.html; NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A(6), available at www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm-sec-
tion.html; (SEC and stock exchange rules also require hotlines or reporting procedures, but in the same way
as SOX § 301-without offering more guidance on what the hotlines/prodecures should do). See also gener-
ally JOHN T. BOSTLEMAN, supra note 3, § 19.9; Michael Delikat, supra note 12, § 7:1. Even though § 301
deals primarily with accounting and auditing, the SOX language "regarding questionable accounting or audit-
ing matters" does not limit complaint "procedures" to auditing and accounting, employers remain free to
open their hotlines to calls denouncing other offenses. Accordingly, "best practices" U.S. companies (in
particular, those that factor in U.S. corporate sentencing guidelines) commonly set up hotlines that let em-
ployees report any corporate fraud, misdeed, or ethics violation, be it discrimination, harassment, product
tampering, misuse of intellectual property, even time-card violations, theft of office supplies, or flouting a no-
smoking or no-alcohol rule. See Starr & Timner, supra note 1 ("virtually all major U.S. corporations have
adopted company-wide codes of ethics that prohibit wide-ranging misconduct, far beyond 'mere' questiona-
ble accounting, and encourage... anonymous reporting of wrongdoing... for the full gamut of employee
misconduct"). Further, SOX § 404 requires control systems to ensure listed companies can make adequate,
SOX-mandated disclosures; this requirement might be read as an indirect requirement for whistleblowing
systems consistent with SOX § 301. See also S.E.C. Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15.
15. SOX § 406, the only other provision of SOX that regulates ethics codes and compliance codes, gener-
ally requires SOX-regulated companies to disclose whether they have adopted a code of ethics that applies to
their "senior financial officers," including the principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting
officer, as well as "persons performing similar functions." SOX § 406(a) (emphasis added). See also Disclo-
sure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of z.02, Rel. Nos. 33-8177 and 34-47235
Gan. 23, 2003), 68 FED. REG. 5109 Gan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/fina/33-8177.htm
(adding principal executive officer to the list of senior financial officers); S.E.C. Item 303 of Reg. S-K, availa-
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whistleblower procedures. But, when the S.E.C. adopted its Rule 10A-3 under Section
301 of SOX,' 6 the S.E.C. affirmatively declined to spell out details on how these employee
hotlines would work, so as to give individual audit committees flexibility to develop their
own tailored procedures. 17 Therefore, while SOX requires "employee" whistleblowing
procedures, company audit committees get very little guidance on what those "proce-
dures" must be, other than the two guiding adjectives that SOX Section 301 offers-
"confidential" and "anonymous." Telephone hotlines and mandatory reporting rules are a
SOX "best practice" within the U:S. and are encouraged by U.S. sentencing guidelines
(and, under SOX, "promot[ing]" mandatory reporting is necessary for "senior financial
officers" and attorneys).is SOX, however, does not mandate that employers force em-
ployees to report their fellow co-workers' violations.
ble at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/regS-K/SK303.html; NASDAQ Rule 4350(n), supra note 14; NYSE
Listed Company Manual § 303A(10). Notably, even SOX § 406 does not force SOX-regulated businesses to
adopt rules that require senior financial officers to report corporate misconduct. Companies only need "rea-
sonably" to "promote" senior-financial-officer reporting. SOX § 406 (emphasis added). The S.E.C. rule that
adopts SOX § 406 defines "code of ethics" to mean such "standards that are reasonably designed to deter
wrongdoing and to promote.. (5) [tlhe prompt internal reporting to an appropriate person or persons identi-
fied in the code of violations of the code." Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Rel. Nos. 33-8177 and 34-47235 (Jan. 23, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 5109 (Jan. 31, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalV33-8177.htm (emphasis added). But this language, too, addresses
only senior financial officers, and does not mandate that ethics codes force senior financial officers to report
corporate misconduct; § 406 does not require mandatory reporting rules even for senior officers. However,
the S.E.C., as directed by SOX § 307, does require attorneys to report violations of securities law. See 17
C.F.R. § 205.3 (2008) (implementing SOX § 307). This article assumes overseas workforces will not employ
"senior financial officers" or attorneys at this SOX § 407 level. That is, the analysis in this article focuses on
employee populations abroad without regard to overseas "senior financial officers" or attorneys. Any SOX-
regulated multinational with senior financial officers and covered in-house attorneys working in Europe
needs to consider SOX §§ 307, 406 compliance, which is beyond the scope of this article.
16. The SOX statute required the S.E.C. to adopt rules implementing certain provisions of SOX, including
§ 301.
17. In its release adopting § 301, the S.E.C. said:
As proposed, we are not mandating specific procedures [for receiving complaints] that the audit com-
mittee must establish. Commentators were split over whether specific procedures should be man-
dated . . . . Given the variety of listed issuers in the U.S. capital markets, we believe audit
committees should be provided with flexibility to develop and utilize procedures appropriate for
their circumstances. The procedures that will be most effective to meet the requirements for a very
small listed issuer with few employees could be very different from the processes and systems that
would need to be in place for large, multi-national [sic] corporations with thousands of employees
in many different jurisdictions. We do not believe that in this instance a "one-size-fits-all" approach would
be appropriate ... [WMe expect each audit committee to develop procedures that work best consis-
tent with the company's individual circumstances...
S.E.C. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees Release Nos. 2003 S.E.C. LEXIS 846 at
"69-*70 (Apr. 9, 2003) (emphasis added) (S.E.C. release implementing Exchange Act § 1OA(m)(l) as amended
by § 301). Notably, the passing reference here to "many different jurisdictions," if meaning national, as
opposed to U.S. state, municipal, and foreign territorial jurisdictions, implies that the S.E.C. assumes the
§ 301 mandate reaches abroad. See infra note 23.
18. Within the U.S. domestically, hotlines and mandatory reporting rules are a "best practice" because they
can help an organization find out about fraud and are consistent with U.S. sentencing guidelines. U.S. sen-
tencing guidelines give credit, in "sentencing of organizations," to those "organizations" that establish "an
effective compliance and ethics program." U'nITED STATEs SENTENCING GUIDELINES MA".'uAL § 8B2.1
(2007). But the sentencing guidelines do not mandate that multinational "organizations" must extend any
such "program" abroad. Id. Also, the sentencing guidelines encourage but do not require confidential, anon-
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That summarizes the SOX hotline mandate in general.19 But our SOX hotline question
here is international: Whether SOX's mandate of "confidential, anonymous" employee
reporting "procedures" extends as well to "employees" of SOX-regulated companies (and
their subsidiaries) who work and live abroad. Unfortunately, Section 301 is unclear and
unsettled on this point.20 But contrary to the widespread assumption of countless U.S.-
based multinationals examining this issue, a viable argument exists that the Section 301
"complaint procedure" mandate is confined to "employee" populations working on U.S.
soil. Therefore, before we look at how European laws might affect Section 301 hotlines,
we need to ask the vital threshold question: Does the Section 301 hotline mandate even
reach Europe in the first place?
Like the rest of SOX, Section 301 applies to "issuers" as defined in the Securities Ex-
change Act. Certain issuers-foreign private issuers-are based overseas and are subject
to Section 301's hotline mandate to the same extent as domestic U.S. issuers. 2 1 Likewise,
many domestic issuers based in the United States have extensive employment operations
abroad.22 To this extent, aspects of the Securities Exchange Act and SOX unquestionably
reach abroad. And for this reason it is widely assumed that Section 301's hotline (com-
plaint procedures) mandate must reach abroad, as well. In fact, even the S.E.C. itself
appears to have originally assumed this. In promulgating early rules under Section 301
(before case law issued on the extraterritorial reach of SOX's whistleblower provisions),
the S.E.C. had implied that Section 301 reaches U.S.-based multinationals' overseas
employees:
The [reporting/holine] procedures that will be most effective to meet the require-
ments for a very small listed issuer with few employees could be very different from
ymous hodines. Specifically, the "organization shall take reasonable steps to have and publicize a system,
which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization's em-
ployees and agents may report. . .potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation." Id. at
§ 8B2.1(b)(5)(C) (emphasis added). SOX § 406 merely requires companies to "promote"-not require-re-
porting among "senior financial officers." SOX § 307 and 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 do require reporting, but only
by "attorneys," not by others. See suopra note 15.
19. Because § 301 merely requires: (A) "treatment" "procedures" for complaints received from anyone, and
(B) "confidential, anonymous...employe[e]" "concern" "procedures," § 301 technically mandates "proce-
dures," not "hodines." Semantically, though, any set of "procedures" for receiving "complaints" might be
said to be, by definition, a hotline.
20. There is very little case law on SOX § 301, and none of it addresses this question.
21. See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 2.10 (p. 65): "Foreign private issuers that are
reporting Companies under the [Securities] Exchange Act must maintain the same disclosure controls and
procedures and the same internal control over financial reporting as other public companies" (cross-refer-
ences omitted). Indeed, the S.E.C. sees SOX as reaching foreign private issuers-the S.E.C. even extended
foreign private issuers' date for SOX compliance. S.E.C. Rule 10A-3(a)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOA-3(a)(5)
(2008). As such, this article assumes the duties that foreign private issuers have under SOX § 301 to provide
hotlines (complaint procedures) for their employees outside the U.S. are the same duties (if any) that U.S.
domestic issuers have to provide hotlines for their employees outside the U.S.
22. SeeJohn T. Bostelman, supra note 3, at § 3:2. SOX § 301(m)(l)(A) prohibits the listing of"any security
of an issuer that is not in compliance with the requirements of" Exchange Act §§ 10A(m)(2)-(6). Thus, the
scope of § 301 appears to turn on a company's status as an "issuer," which would appear to include all SOX-
regulated multinationals, and § 301 does not distinguish multinationals' domestic-U.S. operations from their
overseas operations. Exchange Act §10A(m)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-l(m) (as added by Pub. L. No. 107-204
§ 301).
SPRING 2008
8 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the processes and systems that would need to be in place for large, multinational cor-
porations with thousands of employees in many different jurisdictions.2 3
The fact that the S.E.C. appears implicitly to have assumed § 301 reaches overseas is
hugely relevant to any multinational contemplating the scope of its § 301 hotline or "pro-
cedures." But an implicit and early position of the S.E.C. is far from a settled point of law
and is no guarantee of how a court would rule. So at least in theory, the question remains:
Does Section 301 really reach abroad in the first place?
Maybe not. Nowhere does the text of Section 301 say the hodine mandate reaches
foreign-based employees. And this silence, under law, could itself mean it does not.
"Generally speaking, courts are hesitant to enforce laws extraterritorially without a direct
statement of intent"24 that Congress wanted the law to reach abroad. Under a Supreme
Court endorsed and widely-upheld canon of statutory construction, all U.S. federal stat-
utes are confined to U.S. soil except for those statutes where, in their texts, the U.S.
Congress expressly manifested a clear "contrary intent" to reach overseas. 25 In EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco),26 the U.S. Supreme Court held:
Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the
U.S ... Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority [as to any given federal
statute] is a matter of statutory construction... It is a long-standing principle of Ameri-
can law "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States".... This "canon of construc-
tion" serves ... to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord.
27
In January 2006, a U.S. federal appeals court invoked this canon in a SOX
whistleblower context to hold that SOX's whistleblower retaliation provision, Section 806,
does not reach overseas employees. 28 In Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., an employee
claimed a SOX-regulated company had fired him for reporting accounting infractions.
2 9
23. S.E.C. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 17 at *70-*71 (emphasis
added). This language, however, does not clarify whether these "many different jurisdictions" include juris-
dictions overseas, as opposed to U.S., state, municipal, and foreign territorial jurisdictions. And notably, this
early S.E.C. statement predates the Carnero decision, discussed infra note 29 and accompanying text.
24. Jason Thompson, supra note 2, at 270.
25. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) ("Aramco"), superseded in other respects by statute
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4). Aramco on this point is still good law; the Supreme Court cited it with
approval, inter alia, in June 2005, in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
26. Aramco, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 248 (emphasis added). The "unintended clashes" with "laws...of other nations" and "interna-
tional discord" issue (the sovereignty issue) is an enormous concern as to SOX § 301 hotlines, given the EU
labor and data privacy law doctrines discussed infra. See Frank C. Razzano, Conflicts Between American &
Foreign Law: Does the "Balance of Interests" Test Always Equal America's Interests?, 37 INT'L LAW. 61, 62 (2003)
(arguing U.S. interpretations of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law is overbroad; "if there is a conflict
between American law and foreign law, Americans will always choose that their law is applied").
28. On the extraterritorial reach of SOX whistleblower provisions very broadly, see generally Bosdeman,
supra note 3, §§ 19.10-19.11.1.
29. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006), cert denied 126 S. Ct. 2973 (2006). For
detailed discussions of Carnero, see, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 Micii. L.
REv. 1757, 1775-76 (2007); Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protectisn
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 44-46 (2007); David A. Cohn, Note, Carnero
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He sued for reinstatement and back pay. But this employee was an Argentine working for
the company in South America. Because Section 806's retaliation provision says nothing
about overseas application, the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals held the suit had to be
dismissed, and later the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Section 806
whistleblower retaliation provision simply does not reach abroad because Congress never
said it does.
Section 301, which like Section 806 is a SOX "employe[e]" whistleblower provision, is
every bit as silent on extraterritorial reach. So the Carnero analysis might apply to Section
301, meaning that SOX "complaint" " procedures" may not apply to employee popula-
tions overseas. The conclusion that Section 301 does not reach employees abroad in light
of Carnero seems to trouble multinationals and some American lawyers, who argue that
Carnero cannot possibly extend to Section 301. Section 301 differs from Section 806, they
argue, because Section 301's mandate to set up employee hotlines is somehow less em-
ployment-law-related than is Section 806's prohibition on retaliation, and, somehow, the
canon restricting statutes to U.S. soil might apply more forcefully to laws that grant af-
firmative employee rights than to laws that affirmatively mandate employee hotlines.30
v. Boston Scientific Corporation: An Analysis, 6 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 203 (arguing Carnero is wrongly decided);
Caryn R. Nutt, Comment, Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corporation: Interpreting the Extraterritorial Effect of the
Civil Whistleblower Protection of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 201 (2006). Incidentally, while the
Carnero decision is the highest authority to hold that SOX § 806 does not reach extraterritorially, it is by no
means the only such authority. The U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Commission (OSHA) of the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) is charged with enforcing SOX § 806, and OSHA/DOL administrative case law
unanimously holds with Carnero. There have been a number of such cases. In fact, the Carnero opinion itself
affirmed OSHA/DOL rulings below (the Carnero plaintiff had lost at every level of the proceedings). See, e.g.,
Beck v. Citigroup, Inc., U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges case no. 2006-SOX-
00003 (ALJ Aug, 1, 2006) (SOX § 806 does not reach German national working in Germany for Citigroup
Global Markets Deutschland AG & Co. KGaA); O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., US DOL ALJ case no. 2005-
SOX-00072 (Jan. 20, 2006) (similar holding, later overturned as discussed below); Ede v. Swatch Group, US
DOL ALJ case no. 2004-SOX-068/069 (Jan. 14, 2005) (similar holding); Concone v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
US DOL ALJ case no. 2005-SOX-006 (Dec. 3, 2004) (similar holding; discussed in Dworkin, supra this note, at
1776).
This article treats Carnero as current applicable law. On February 5, 2008, after Carnero, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York decided a similar case with an opposite result, but
ruling consistent with the Carnero holding, and therefore consistent with the analysis of Carnero in this article.
In O'Mahony v. Accenture LTD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10600 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008), the America-hired
plaintiff worked in France first for a U.S. entity and then for a French subsidiary of a U.S. entity, and
purportedly blew the whistle on a claimed violation of French law. But the O'Mabony whistleblowing report
was a complaint to the U.S. parent entity and complained of an allegedly-improper decision made in the U.S.
by U.S. actors. The O'Mabony court expressly distinguished its facts from Carnero, holding it is "not con-
fronted with a transaction that is predominantly foreign which would require [the court] to decide" the extra-
territoriality-of-SOX question, because plaintiff:
O'Mahony was an employee of Accenmure LLP, Accenture's United States subsidiary, during the
time the alleged fraudulent misconduct occurred, complaining about misconduct of Accenrure
LLP in the United States. Therefore the Court is not being asked to intervene to apply American
law in a dispute between foreigners that occurred abroad concerning a foreign transaction.
Id. at *23. The court added it "need not decide" the issue of whether "to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction"
or to address the "extraterritorial application" of SOX. Id.
30. Another argument made to distinguish Carnero from § 301 is that Carnero involved a foreign-citizen
plaintiff. The Carnero holding might have differed (so goes the argument) had the plaintiff been an American
working overseas. But this distinction seems unlikely because, while a citizenship distinction appears in the
texts of U.S. anti-discrimination statutes, as to their application abroad, this distinction has no grounding at
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This distinction does find a bit of support in dictum in the Carnero opinion itself, which
says that Section 301 "does not... purport to confer enforceable rights upon employees,
hence does not implicate theforeign sovereignty and other concerns [of Section] 806 . . .-31
But this Carnero dictum seems to lose its force in light of the fact that a fierce "foreign
sovereignty" conflict is indeed now raging between Section 301 and EU data and labor
laws. 32 Further, Section 301, like Section 806, is an employment law conferring a right on
employees (Section 301 contains the word "employees" and it grants employees a right to
access hotline procedures). In any event, even if Section 301 were not an employment
law, the case law supporting the non-extraterritoriality canon of construction reaches
completely outside the employment arena and extends, for example, to U.S. federal stat-
utes on non-employment topics, including the Federal Trade Commission Act franchise
law and U.S. copyright law.33
Therefore, a SOX-regulated multinational might conceivably rely on Carnero and shut
off its SOX hotline abroad, reasoning that Section 301's hotline mandate is confined to
U.S. soil. Under this strategy, the employer's position would be that SOX does not tell
audit committees they have to offer Section 301 -style hotlines to "employees" who work
abroad.3
4
all in the texts of SOX §§ 301 or 806. To that extent, the U.S. citizenship issue seems a false analogy to
discrimination statutes. That is, under SOX §§ 301 and 806, citizenship-of-whistleblower is a distinction
without a difference, even though citizenship-of-discrimination-victim is a vital issue as to the extraterritorial
reach of the U.S. discrimination laws.
Incidentally, the Q'Mabony case, supra note 29, which finds on a particular set of facts that the SOX
whistleblowing provision can reach an employee overseas, does not raise the citizenship issue at all. In that
case, the Irish-surnamed, American-hired plaintiff who worked for Accenture in France appears not to have
been a U.S. citizen. The O'Mahony opinion never mentions her citizenship, and indeed never mentions
citizenship as relevant to the extratetrritorial-reach-of-SOX analysis. But according to the order in
O'Mahony v. Accenture, U.S. DOL ALJ Order of Jan. 20, 2006 (US DOL case no. 2005-SOX-00072),
Rosemary O'Mahony "is an Irish national residing in France." (The ALJ order does not say whether she is a
dual U.S. citizen.)
In any event, the vast majority of multinationals' outside-U.S. employee populations are not U.S. citizens, so
for SOX § 301 purposes, a multinational's hotline and whistleblower retaliation positions need to be analyzed
as they affect non-Americans abroad.
31. Carnero, supra note 29, at 10 (emphasis added).
32. See discussion infra at Parts III and IV.
33. Aramco, supra note 25, is the U.S. Supreme Court's confirmation of the well-established and logical
common-law canon of statutory construction that statutes apply only on the soil of the country that passed
them, unless they expressly say otherwise. While Aramco happened to arise in the employment law context,
the logic behind the no-extraterritoriality canon it construes is not linked to employment law or to "enforcea-
ble rights [conferred] upon employees," or, indeed, to anything having to do with master/servant relation-
ships. Hence, not surprisingly, we have many cases (including from the U.S. Supreme Court) in areas having
nothing whatsoever to do with employment law that invoke the venerable no-extraterritoriality canon. A
survey of all those cases is beyond the scope of this article but is the subject of other articles. Examples of two
such cases include, e.g., Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (citing
Aranico to hold Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule does not reach beyond U.S. soil); Subafilms, Ltd.
v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Aramco to hold U.S. federal Copyright Act
does not reach beyond U.S. soil). Under the logic of Neiman, Subafilms, and other cases, if SOX § 806 does
not reach abroad (as it does not, per Canero, supra note 29), then SOX § 301 cannot reach abroad, either,
even if § 301 were not an employment statute (although it is one, to the extent it includes the word "employ-
ees" in its text). See generally Spector, sv-pra note 25; Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993); Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
34. See sipra note 33.
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But even to the extent this strategy might be viable, SOX-regulated multinationals seem
extremely reluctant to adopt it, perhaps because the S.E.C. did not originally seem ready
to accept it. Also, although SOX passed as recently as 2002, its Section 301 hotline man-
date seems intractably to have taken root. In our compliance-focused environment of the
new millennium, 35 multinationals seem so committed to stamping out wrongdoing and to
using hotlines as a tool for doing so that they seem firmly committed to launching U.S.-
style whistleblowing procedures everywhere they operate, even if the hotlines may not,
technically, be SOX-mandated. 36 As such, even if the Carnero non-extraterritoriality argu-
ment were to win out in the Section 301 context, compliance-focused multinationals
might remain reluctant to shut off their hotlines outside the U.S. if only because in this
millennium companies want to offer their employees around the world robust reporting
procedures that might to nip wrongdoing in the bud. 37
II. SOX Friction in Europe Socially
Now understanding SOX's hotline mandate and the extent to which it might (or might
not) reach abroad, our inquiry turns to how European law may pose a conflict; that is, we
now address the European "foreign sovereignty . .. concerns" 38 that might clash with
Section 301. But before we examine texts of any relevant European laws, we need to
understand the strangely fervent European social context that swirls around whistleblow-
ing and hotlines. After all (an American might wonder), how could Europeans possibly
justify blocking as laudable a rule as Section 301, which merely has employers encourage
whistleblowers to come forward and expose corporate wrongdoing that might defraud
shareholders?
The SOX statute generally has been widely criticized in Europe.39 In the words of the
head of one French government agency, "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act... is very contested [in
35. See supra first paragraph of the text of this article.
36. This observation is based on the author's conversations with human resources officers and in-house
employment lawyers at a couple of dozen multinationals, about the Canero argument in the § 301 context.
Because (before Carnero) the S.E.C. had seemed implicitly to assume SOX § 301 applies abroad (see supra note
17), any multinational that invokes Carnero and shuts off its hotline abroad will risk litigating an S.E.C.
challenge in court, making the Carnero argument to a judge, which SOX-regulated multinationals seem un-
derstandably reluctant to do. (As to the effect of U.S. sentencing guidelines on multinational hotines, see
supra note 18.) See generally infra note 255.
37. Nevertheless, the Carnero, sopra note 29, argument against the extraterritorial reach of the SOX § 301
whisteblowing "procedures" mandate is a vital part of the analysis even for those multinationals that fully
intend to offer a hotline in Europe. To the extent there appears to be some head-on conflict between SOX
and European laws on hotlines, that conflict melts away if the Canero argument holds. A multinational's
hotline in Europe can conform to European local rules, and need not conform to SOX, under the Canero
doctrine, if the Carnero logic reaches § 301. See infra note 256.
38. See Carnero, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
39. European objections to SOX were legion, and a catalog of them is beyond the scope of this article. For
one short summary, see, e.g., Kristina A. Sadlak, soipra note 10, at 3-4, 26-29, 32-35. See also Schaffer, supra
note 11, at 1842 ("The international community did not welcome SOX with open arms. From its inception,
[SOX] has been criticized by foreign commentators as [having been] hastily drafted and as an attempt by
Congress to achieve a quick-fix solution to corporate governance problems in an election year."). There has
been a trend of non-U.S.-based multinationals to "delist" from U.S. exchanges: "Since 1 January 2007...
numerous companies have delisted from the NYSE, including the British Gas Group and British Airways.
The NYSE has estimated that non-US companies with a combined value of US$1 trillion.. will delist in the
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Europe] on many matters." 40 In criticizing SOX generally, Europeans have argued that
the SOX approach of requiring corporate officers to verify their financial statements is
naive, unrealistic, expensive, ineffective, and, for that matter, against America's own na-
tional interests (to the extent that SOX creates a disincentive keeping foreign private issu-
ers from listing on U.S. exchanges). These general European criticisms of SOX, though,
are completely separate from the European push-back on the specific issue of Section 301
anonymous whistleblower hotlines, which is rooted in two separate issues: anonymous
reporting and mandatory reporting rules that force employees to denounce their fellows
who commit audit/accounting frauds.
In parts of Continental Europe, especially Belgium, Germany, France, and the Nether-
lands, anonymous mandatory denunciations smack of WWII- and communist-era author-
itarianism-neighbor spying on, and then denouncing, neighbor. According to the
Chairman of the EU's Article 29 Working Party (an EU-level advisory body made up of
data privacy officers from the EU member states):
[I]n the specific European context.. . anonymous [whistleblower] reporting evokes
some of the darkest times of recent history on the European continent, whether dur-
ing World War II or during more recent dictatorships in Southern and Eastern Eu-
rope. This historical specificity [explains] a lot of the reluctance of EU Data
Protection Authorities to allow anonymous [whistleblower hotline] schemes being
advertised as such in companies as a normal mode of reporting concerns. 41
In light of this history, some Europeans seem to have a visceral reaction against "snitch-
ing" to authorities, which can evoke the secret police denunciations that, for some of their
countrymen, meant death in a concentration camp.42 As such, anonymous hotlines and
mandatory reporting rules spark intense push-back from some employee populations in
certain, but by no means all, European jurisdictions. Anonymity (whistleblower staying
anonymous while denouncing a named target) poses a special concern to some in Conti-
future." Alex Bafi, Erik Morris, & Ben Novick, Exiting the U.S. Markets: Easing the Way, PLC CROSS-BOR-
DER QUARTERLY, Oct.-Dec. 2007, 52, 54, available at http://tinyurl.com/3ylzrt.
40. Alex Tfirk, Chairman of CNIL, Session 3: Whistleblowing; Integrity Lines: Elements of Intervention,
unpublished position paper submitted to the European Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, Bu-
dapest (Apr. 24-25, 2006), available at http://abiweb.obh.hu/dep/springconference2006/.
41. Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman, EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to Ethiopis Tafara,
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of International Affairs (July 3, 2006) at 3, availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/odthers/2006-07-03-reply-whistleblowing.
pdf.
42. According to Daniel Westman, a lawyer, speaking in the context of SOX employee compliance in
Europe:
It is an unfortunate historical fact that many countries-in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America-
have had or still have repressive governments which use informants as a tool of repression. Apart
from legalities, in some [European] countries there is a strong visceral reaction against the idea of
"informing" or . . ."denouncing" co-workers."
Stephan Taub, Multinationals Find SOX is Conflicting with Local Laws, COMPLIANCE WEEK, July 19, 2005,
http://www.complianceweek.com. See also Schaffer, supra note 10, at 1852 ("Slanderous denunciation from
anonymous accusers is contrary to French historical and social principles. The French aversion to anony-
mous whistleblowing dates back to the French Revolution, during which there was a practice called the 'lettres
de chacbet' [by which] people could be anonymously denounced as enemies and sent off to the guillotine.").
See also generally infra note 45.
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nental Europe because the cloak of anonymity is inherently untrustworthy and all but
invites enemies to lodge trumped-up denunciations out of spite. Ironically, given the con-
flict between this view and SOX, it is actually the Europeans' priorities here that champion
two values we Americans see as associated with our justice system: due process and the
presumption of innocence.43
In the United States, whistleblowing seems more revered than reviled, and making
workplace report procedures available rarely raises acute human resources concerns.44
But in parts of Northern Continental Europe, the social aversion to whistleblower hot-
lines can strike some on a surprisingly visceral level and can spark fierce push-back. Some
in Europe instantly take personal offense at the launch of a hotline, assuming the em-
ployer is formalizing an offensive practice that should have ended with World War II. For
example, immediately after one U.S. Fortune 500 multinational launched its SOX hotline,
a French rank-and-file employee sent an all-hands email to every company employee in
France denouncing what he called the employer's "Vichy" tactics.
4 5
43. In celebrating the whistleblower (such as, for example, Mark Felt, the Watergate "Deep Throat"
whistleblower, Enron whistleblower Lynn Brewer, and , the American environmental crusader Erin Brock-
ovich, whom Hollywood cast with Julia Roberts), Americans seem to identify with the lone activist crusader
against the guilty, faceless entity. In contrast, Belgian/French/German/Dutch hotline critics seem to cham-
pion the due process rights and presumption of innocence of those whom whistleblowers accuse of wrongdo-
ing?and are skeptical of an employer's ability to exonerate an innocent target through an internal
investigation. On one level, this split in outlooks seems ironic because Americans pride themselves on re-
specting due process and presumption of innocence, two fundamental rights under our Constitution. But
perhaps the difference in outlook here is anchored in the uniquely-American doctrine of employment-at-
will-the European analogy to due process and presumption of innocence is a criminal analogy that sees
employees' jobs as akin to their liberty. Americans steeped in employment-at-will may be slower to make this
analogy: to an American, perhaps as distinct from a European, getting fired is not really comparable to being
imprisoned. See infra note 201.
44. In contrast to some Europeans, it is said that Americans revere the brave whistleblower who stands up
to a corporation and exposes nefarious misdeeds to the public eye. In fact, even in the United States, the
social ramifications of whistleblowing are more nuanced. For example, in discussing whether American col-
lege students should report classmates "widely known to cheat on tests in...organic-chemistry class, a course
that weeds out weak students from the premed track," it has been observed that "our vocabulary for those
who do this is largely pejorative: tattletale, squealer, rat, canary (if you attend med school in a Caguey
movie)." Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Attack from Beyond, N.Y. TLIAES, Nov. 4, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
For that matter, some Europeans' aversion to anonymity is also more nuanced. For example, in one impor-
tant hotline case from Germany, a German labor court criticized a U.S.-crafted hotline because its guarantees
for preserving whistleblower anonymity were too weak, the German court actually wanted the anonymity
protections beefed up. See the discussion of Wal-Mart case, infra note 59.
45. This is a personal experience of the author, who, while working on assignment in Paris in early 2003 for
this Fortune 500 U.S. multinational, the very day after the launch of the company's SOX hotline in France,
received this all-hands "Vichy" email. The point is that this response (equating hotlines with Vichy tactics)
seemed a visceral reaction of a rank-and-file Northern European employee, not some studied legal analysis.
To this extent, the Northern-Europe-vs.-U.S. social issue here is more than a sociological construct or theo-
retical possibility.
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Summary chart #1




Follow SOX? Compliance critical: Important Affront to sovereignty: U.S. has
federal law no business regulating behavior
in Europe
Effect of Blow whistle = expose fraud Denounce colleague = betrayal
whistleblowing?
Whistleblower's Exposing fraud helps company Collaborating with authorities
motives? and society by denouncing fellows curries
favor for personal gain
Social policy at Stop Enron-like corporate fraud Protect target's due process and
stake? presumption of innocence rights
Legal barriers None (hotline is a management New work rules = "mandatory
to policy/hot- prerogative) subject of bargaining" (inform/
line consult)
Legal barriers None (data from call unregu- Call creates data file, implicat-
once call placed lated) ing strict rules-especially if
"sensitive data" or if sent EU-
to-U.S.
Yet, having said so much about the Belgian/French/German/Dutch aversion to
whistleblowing as antisocial "snitching" at best and subversive denunciation at worst,
Americans need to take real care not to stereotype. There are many cultures and sub-
cultures among the twenty-seven EU member states; it would be unfair to pigeonhole
them all as being as whistleblower-intolerant as the French and the Germans. 46 In En-
gland, for example, neighbor-on-neighbor police denunciations are said to be an en-
trenched cultural trait that some say is itself a legacy of World War 11. 4 7 Indeed, the U.K.
46. Socially, the anti-whistleblowing phenomenon seems starkest in Belgium, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands, and, contrary to sweeping generalizations sometimes heard in the U.S., does not seem to be a
pan-European phenomenon. See infra notes 47, 49.
47. In England, neighbor-on-neighbor denunciations to the police may be, if anything, socially encouraged.
According to one contemporary Englishman:
We are quite a polite nation, so it's hard, but, yes, we are on the lookout [for criminal neighbors]
and actually [denouncing neighbors to police] is not new," said Peter York, a columnist for The
Independent on Sunday. "It comes from our grandparents' generation from the war and was kept
alive by the I.R.A. and is with us now, a belief that we can't expect the world to be a lovely, kind
place, and that we need to be vigilant .... lAiccording to Jake Trees, a spokesperson for the
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and many other member states, from the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain to
the European Economic Area's Norway, have laws that actively promote workplace
whisdeblowing, laws that, in fact, implement a rarely-discussed 2005 EU Commission
recommendation that affirmatively promotes "anonymous" whistleblowing.4s In some of
these countries, such as the U.K. and Spain, the local pro-whisdeblowing laws may be
quite consistent with local cultural norms. For example, although Spain suffered longer
under fascism than anywhere in Europe, anecdotal evidence shows Spanish neighbor-on-
neighbor denunciations thriving today, at least in parts of the country.49 And perhaps no
EU government is as pro-whisdeblowing as Slovakia, where a post-communist-era crimi-
nal law called Act 300/2005 actually mandates government denunciations.5 0 Under that
law, a Slovak who reliably learns of a neighbor committing a crime automatically assumes
British transport police... "Do [British] people speak out [to report neighbors]?" Mr. Trees
asked. "It's one of the tenets of our policy that they do, and they do that. Passengers [on public
transit] are becoming very, very aware of things that are out of the ordinary." British cities have
also been arrayed with closed-circuit television cameras focused on lobbies, sidewalks, roads, and
public spaces.
Graham Bowley, The British are Watching, Very Closely," N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 4, at 2.
48. The U.K Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 protects from employment retaliation, or known in
England as "victimisation," those who blow the whistle either within their employer organization or to the
police. See Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, c.23 (U.K.). The Norway Working Environment Act re-
quires employers to establish procedures ("routines...or... other measures") for the "internal notification
concerning censurable conditions" in the workplace. Working Environment Act, No. 10 (2007) ch. 3-6,
http://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/binfil/download.php?tid=41256 (English translation). In Portugal, guidance
from the securities regulator from November 2005 urges Portuguese publicly held companies to put in place
some sort of report procedure. In Spain, Recommendation 50.1(d) of Part II of the Cddigo Unificado de Buen
Gobierno (approved by the Spanish Comisidn Nacional del Mercado de Valores, Spain's version of the S.E.C., on
May 19, 2006) recommends, but does not mandate, that the audit committees of Spanish-traded public com-
panies "establish a mechanism whereby staff can confidentially report and, if necessary, anonymously, any
irregularities they detect in the course of their duties, in particular financial or accounting irregularities, with
potentially serious implications for the firm." Report of the Special Working Group on the Good Govern-
ance of Listed Companies, CNMV (2006), http://www.cnmv.es/publicaciones/CUDefinitivo-e.pdf (english
translation) (hereinafter CNMV]. Nevertheless, this same recommendation also says that these "mecha-
nism[s]" must scrupulously comply with limitations established by the Spanish Data Protection Act, and
Spain's data law, in turn, flatly prohibits anonymous whistleblowing. See id.; see also infra notes 174-75. This
Spanish securities recommendation follows a rarely-discussed, non-binding EU recommendation: the EU
Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors
of Listed Companies and the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board. 2005 Oj. (L52) 4, http://eov-lex.
europa.edu/LexUriServ/site/en/8j/2005/l-052/l05220050225enO0510063.pdf [hereinafter 2005/162/EC]
Annex 4.3.8 recommends (but does not require) that "audit committees of [public companies] should review
the process whereby the company complies with existing provisions regarding the possibility for employees to
report alleged significant irregularities in the company, by way of complaints or through anonymoussubmissions,
normally to an independent director.. ." Id. (emphasis added).
49. The author's family has significant ongoing personal experience with neighbor-on-neighbor denuncia-
tions to local government authorities in villages in contemporary Andalusia. Based on years of family experi-
ence, the author has observed that, at least in parts of present-day Southern Andalusia, neighbor-on-neighbor
denunciations to government authorities for zoning and permitting violations are so common as to be rou-
tine. This observation might not be confined to Andalusia; the author knows of at least one recent case of an
anonymous neighbor-on-neighbor denunciation in Northern coastal Spain for an alleged violation of Spain's
Ley de Costas, a law that limits real estate development near Spain's beaches. Indeed, Spain has a legal recom-
mendation that actively encourages whistleblowing. See 2005/162/EC, supra note 48.
50. See Slovak Criminal Code as amended, Act No. 300/2005 Coll. as amended.
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a duty to turn in the wrongdoer to police. 5' Failure to denounce is itself a crime punisha-
ble by three years in prison, for the Slovak felony of "not whisdeblowing."
52
However, the fact that many EU states do not seem to share the Belgian/French/Ger-
man/Dutch cultural aversion to whisdeblowing does not mean that even those other states
embrace SOX-style workplace hodines. As we will see, evolving EU principles of labor
and data privacy law may have propagated the skeptical Belgian/French/German/Dutch
anti-denunciation view into law across the EU.
m. European Labor Law on "Information and Consultation" with Workers
The keen skepticism of "denunciations" in parts of Europe is more than an interesting
sociological construct; it might explain why some Europeans seem to interpret existing
laws so as to block SOX-style whistleblower hotlines. The issue reaches two distinct doc-
trines under law in Europe: labor law and data privacy law.5 3 Both these doctrines can
obstruct SOX-compliant whistleblower programs. Of the two doctrines as they apply in
the hotline context, data privacy law gets more attention, perhaps because it is more com-
plex. But the completely separate labor law issue, works council "information and consul-
tation," is every bit as critical for multinationals trying to roll out hotlines in Europe. 54
In much of Europe, workers organize themselves not only into trade unions but also
into "works councils," in-house employee representative groups with which management
"informs" and "consults" on issues affecting the workplace. 55 Under these countries' sys-
tems, European employers have a duty (analogous to a U.S. "mandatory subject of bar-
gaining") to tell works council representatives about proposed changes to the workplace
and to consult (or negotiate) with them in good faith about their opinions. 56 Launching a
51. See id.
52. See id. Indeed, it has been said that government-sponsored whistleblower hotlines in Europe date back
to Middle Ages-era Venice, where mail slots were set up to accept notes of anonymous reports of illegality.
53. A cynical American, or a legal realist, might argue that the Belgian/French/German/Dutch social aver-
sion to whistleblower hodines may be precisely what drives some European legal systems to interpret their
existing labor and data privacy laws so as to impede these hotlines (as discussed infra). Support for that view
might be found in the U.K's less-aggressive approach, as compared to the more aggressive approach of some
European countries (discussed infra). For a broad overview of the conflict here, see generally Delikat, supra
note 12, at 36-37.
54. In Germany this is known as "co-determination."
55. National works councils coexist with, but are completely separate from, European trade unions. Both
national works councils and national trade unions in Europe play roles similar to that of labor unions in
America, which represent employees at the company level and have a right to offer input on terms and
conditions of employment. National works councils (or at least national-level information and consultation
procedures) have come to all EU countries via a 2002 directive. Council Directive 2002/14/EC, 2002 OJ.
(L80) 29. These country-level works councils/procedures are entirely separate from European Works Coun-
cils, which are pan-European bodies. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., New European Law on "Information and
Consultation" with Local "Works Councils": Plan Now or Pay Later, 10 HR ADviSOR 2, at 6 (2004), reprinted in 13
INr'L HR J. 2, at 5 (Spring 2004); See also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., New European Law on "Works Councils"
Demands Headquarters Strategy, 12 Metropolitan Corp. Couns. 6 (2004), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2004/June/18.pdf.
56. Essentially, in U.S. terminology, works councils in Europe have a right to be involved in (bargain over,
although some argue that consultation differs from bargaining) issues that materially affect terms and condi-
tions of employment. See Dowling, Jr., supra note 55, at 3. In France, specifically, the labor code imposes a
two-tier analysis: an employer must consult with its works council before unilaterally changing anything in
the workplace that would affect: (1) "control of the activities of employees," or (2) "changes in internal rules."
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new rule or policy-such as a denunciation hodine-comes under this duty if the new rule
or policy materially changes work conditions. Given the Belgian/French/German/Dutch
taboo against denunciations, 57 a European worker may see as a "material" change any
proposed hotline by which his fellows could anonymously denounce him or any
mandatory-reporting work rule that can get him fired if he refuses to turn in his fellows. 5s
In June 2005, a German labor court invoked works council doctrine to strike down
Wal-Mart's SOX hotline, along with its broad code of conduct. 59 Wal-Mart's policy, like
most U.S. multinationals', had a mandatory reporting rule by which employees could get
fired for doing nothing in that the policy imposed an affirmative duty to whistleblow on
co-worker fraud. Also, Wal-Mart's policy, like many U.S. multinationals', went well be-
yond SOX by requiring denunciations of wrongdoing not only for audit and accounting
fraud but also for non-SOX violations like theft and harassment. The German labor court
found Wal-Mart had violated Section 87 1(1) of the German Works Constitution Act by
implementing its denunciation rule, hotline, and code of conduct in Germany via a U.S.
headquarters mandate that had skipped over the necessary step of first exhausting works
council "co-determination" (the tougher German version of "information and consulta-
tion," that implies works council consent). 60 Even though Wal-Mart is an Arkansas-based
multinational that had implemented its global policy and hotline at least in part as man-
dated by a U.S. federal law, the German labor court refused to accept that the global-
policy context, or even the U.S. SOX hotline mandate, excused Wal-Mart's local German
subsidiary from its local labor law bargaining obligations. 61
For the standard under German law, see infra note 58. Otherwise, the precise issues that an employer must
take up with its works councils is a matter of local law, and even of company-level ("enterprise-level") agree-
ments and customs. See Dowling, Jr., supra note 55, at 3-4.
57. Discussed supra Part II.
58. Mandatory reporting rules can be a hot-button issue to Europeans because these rules make doing
nothing (e.g., failing to report a culpable co-worker) a dischargeable offense, and to that extent the imposition
of these rules is argued to be a material change in the workplace. American organizations operating abroad
run into significant HR, labor union, and works council problems when they issue heavy-handed mandatory
reporting rules that force employees to report on co-workers. In some non-European countries, such as
Australia, mandatory "report-on-your-coworker" rules can be void under local employment law. These
mandatory reporting rules, although a best practice within the United States, are not expressly SOX-man-
dated (at least as to non-lawyer employees). See supra note 15; see generally supra Part I; see infra text accompa-
nying note 187, 210.
59. Wal-Mart, Wuppertal Labour Court, 5th Div., 5 BV 20/05,June 15, 2005 (F.R.G.), translated at http://
www.faegre.com/articles/downform2.asp?docnum= I &aid= 1691 [hereinafter Wal-Mart]. For a discussion of
the Wal-Mart case, see Thompson, upra note 2, at 274-77.
60. Id. The German Works Constitution Act § 87 1(1), prohibits German employers from unilaterally
changing "the order of the workplace and the conduct of employees" without first "co-determining" with the
"works council" (company-level labor representative body). Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) [Works
Constitution Act 1972]. In American parlance, Wal-Mart is a mandatory subject of bargaining case that holds
Wal-Mart violated German labor law by unilaterally implementing a whistleblower system without first nego-
tiating with worker representatives. See Wal-Mart, supra note 59. The penalty for this violation, in Germany,
is that a German labor court could (as in Wal-Mart) strike the non-compliant policy. See Works Constitution
Act. The works council could also, as in Wal-Mart, get an injunction enjoining enforcement of the policy. Id.
Ultimately, a German employer that is a repeat offender could also be fined under a quasi-criminal sanction.
Id. And adverse labor law rulings in Germany can have negative public relations repercussions.
61. Wal-Mart, supra note 59. Because Wal-Mart's policy made compliance mandatory-for example, it
required denouncing co-worker SOX violations-it amounted to a new work rule that, under German labor
law, Wal-Mart could not unilaterally implement. Id. As of late 2007, the Wal-Mart opinion had been reaf-
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The Wal-Mart decision is procedural. It does not rule hotlines or codes of conduct per
se illegal; it merely requires bargaining over them.6 2 The decision breaks no new ground;
German human resources has always recognized the need to "co-determine" with works
councils on new policies and work rules. 63 Indeed, Germany's Wal-Mart analysis also
applies in other countries with tough works council laws, including Austria, France, and
the Netherlands. For instance, French labor courts regularly strike down unilaterally-im-
plemented ethics policies for failure to inform and consult. 4 In Austria, under the Labor
Constitution Act, a whistleblowing hotline would be deemed a "mechanism of control,"
requiring works council consent or, in workplaces without works councils, employees'
collective consent. For that matter, the analysis in Wal-Mart may not differ from well-
settled U.S. labor law principles: in the United States, unionized employers are usually
held to have a mandatory duty to bargain over new terms and conditions of employment
that affect the workplace, including new workplace surveillance/oversight practices.
65
IV. European Data Protection/Privacy Laws and Whistleblower Hotlines
While adhering to worker "information and consultation" rules is a key part of
whistleblower hotline compliance in Europe, the major legal battleground over hotlines is
firmed by one other local German labor court, which also held that works council co-determination rights
reach whistleblower hotlines?a little-known decision from the Regional Labour Court of Diisseldorf of Dec.
14, 2005. Incidentally, the Wal-Mart court mentioned along the way that Wal-Mart's policy offered employ-
ees no practical guarantee of anonymity-the Wal-Mart court was actually concerned that an employee using
the hotline might have his call traced and his anonymity breached. Id. In this respect, the German court's
concern regarding anonymity was precisely the opposite of the concern in France-that whistleblower ano-
nymity threatens denounced victims of whistleblowing. See ifra Part IV(A).
62. An issue permeating employee information/consultation in this context is that American companies
launching SOX hodines should account for the deep-rooted Belgian/French/German/Dutch aversion to de-
nunciation procedures, see supra Part II. A U.S. multinational sitting down with employee representatives in
Europe to discuss a hotline should expect considerably more push-back than would be typical from employee
counterparts stateside.
63. The lesson of Wal-Mart is that U.S.-based organizations need to ensure their European operations
"inform and consult" with works councils before rolling out new rules and procedures. See Wal-Mart, supra
note 59. Of course, a U.S.-based multinational's German subsidiary would be in a difficult situation if its
works council refused to agree to a reasonable SOX policy-but technically, the challenge of winning workers
representatives' consent in the mandatory subject of bargaining context, as well as the related issue of im-
passe, is a venerable labor law issue with ramifications well beyond whistleblower policies. A unionized com-
pany in the United States would face similar issues if a union were to try to block implementation of, for
example, a SOX hotline or an anti-harassment work rule. See infra note 65.
64. See, e.g., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, Oct. 6,
2004, no. 04/02865 [hereinafter Novartis Case]. This French case involved ethics policies outside the SOX
context launched by a non-U.S.-based multinational; it also required informing and consulting with employee
representatives. Similar French cases include one involving SigmaKalon (Nanterre, 7/15/05) and Schindler
Group (Versailles, 6/17/04).
65. See National Labor Relations Act § 7(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (2006). There is abundant authority
holding U.S. unionized employers commit an unfair labor practice if they unilaterally launch a new workplace
surveillance/oversight program that changes terms and conditions of employment, without first having bar-
gained in good faith with the union. See, e.g., Cal. Newspapers P'ship and N. Cal. Media Workers' Guild,
350 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (2007) (unilaterally implementing new email monitoring policy held unfair labor prac-
tice; changing email monitoring policy held mandatory subject of bargaining); Brewers & Maltsters, Local
Union No. 6 v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), affg 342 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (employer installing
workplace surveillance camera held mandatory subject of bargaining).
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fought not over labor law but over data protection/data privacy law. 66 The same simmer-
ing Belgian/French/German/Dutch hostilities to whistleblowing that might have been the
subtext to the German Wal-Mart works council case 67 might also underlie the restrictive
European interpretations of data protection laws in the whistleblower hotline context.
But in Europe, the whistleblower-hotline-related legal issues regarding data privacy law
are more complex, and the stakes are perhaps higher.
Every EU member state has adopted ("transposed") into its local (national) law data
protection rules consistent with the EU Data Protection Directive, 68 a template privacy
mandate completely unlike the data-privacy-law requirements of the United States.
69
Under the EU data directive, each EU member state has its own national data privacy law
and even its own national data bureaucracy, or enforcement agency, called a Data Protec-
tion Authority, or DPA. Each member state's privacy law and DPA is in some respects
unique, but all are aligned ("harmonized") around the common template of the EU Data
Directive. 7
0
The ramifications of these EU privacy laws are sweeping. European data protection law
not only reaches its tentacles into many types of business recordkeeping, including human
resources personnel files, but also into customer data- of all sorts and even into journalism,
research, and government. 7 1 One specific interpretation of EU data law reaches
whistleblower hotlines-an interpretation that France pioneered, but that has now been
ratified, in some form, by a data protection advisory body of the EU and also, as of early
2008, by some written guidance from the national DPAs of seven other member states:
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and even the U.K.72
No two member states take the exact same position, and the inconsistent patchwork of
rules across Europe raises obvious compliance challenges for global employers.
7 3
66. Europeans tend to refer to "data protection" law, whereas Americans seem to prefer the term "data
privacy." Perhaps there are subtle differences between these terms, but this article uses them
interchangeably.
67. Compare Part II, with Wal-Mart, supra note 59.
68. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 OJ. (L281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive]. For discussions by this
author of the EU directive implementing ("transposition") process, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the
Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-1997: EU Employment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 43, 47-49 (1996); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 EC, 11 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564,
574-77 (1991).
69. For a summary of U.S. data privacy law, see, e.g., PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND
DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 1-13 (Christopher Wolf ed., 2006).
70. Directive, supra note 68.
71. See id. For a summary of the data directive's core provisions, see, e.g., DONALD C. DOWLING, JR. &
JEREMY M. MITT'MAN, Chapter 14 in PROSKSAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 70, at § 14:2; Donald C. Dow-
ling, Jr., Preparing to Resolve U.S.-Based Employers' Disputes Under Europe's New Data Privacy Law, 2 J. OF ALT.
Disp. RES. IN EMPLOYMFNr 31 (2000). See also J6rg Rehder & Erika C. Collins, The Legal Transfer of
Employment-Related Data to Outside the EU: Is It Still Even Possible?, 39 INT'L LAW. 129 (2005).
72. This list is current only to the end of October 2007. Other member states were expected to issue
written guidance after that date; for example, Finland was expected to issue guidance before the end of 2007.
73. To Americans it is not always obvious how anonymous whistleblowing implicates data protection/pri-
vacy laws in the first place. The analysis, though, is simple: The EU's sweeping data protection laws reach all
data about personally-identifiable individuals. See DOWLING, JR. & MrrarmN, supra note 71, § 14:2.1. Even
anonymous whistleblowers general identify some target individual. For example, if some employee "Horst"
calls a hotline, retains his anonymity, but blows the whistle on his co-worker "Dieter," and if the company
makes a notation about that call, the notation itself instantly becomes regulated personal data, about Dieter
(Horst remains anonymous, so the call note is not regulated personal data about him).
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This part of this article addresses the state of whistleblower-hodine data protection law
in these nine European jurisdictions: France, the EU advisory body, and seven other
member states. Taking a geographical and chronological approach, we will summarize the
data protection law specific to hotines in each of the nine jurisdictions in the order the
guidance was issued. We will address the well-known regulations from France and the
well-known opinion from the EU advisory body, which have already been widely reported
stateside.74 We will also analyze the written hotline positions of the seven other member
state DPAs that are far less well-known in the U.S.?indeed, not all of this guidance is even
available in English, and little of it has ever before been explicated for the American
reader.
After taking this geographical and chronological approach summarizing the nine EU
jurisdictions' hotline-specific positions, we will switch to a topical approach and catalogue,
in checklist form, the substantive EU data-protection-law compliance issues that come
into play with hotlines in Europe, including even in those EU jurisdictions that have not
yet issued hodine-specific guidance.
A. FRANCE
Between Summer 2005 and Spring 2006, France issued three case opinions plus three
sets of regulations on the conflict between SOX hodines and French data law. In late May
2005, France's DPA, the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des liberts ("CNIL")
kicked off the SOX-hodine-in-Europe debate when, on a single day, it declined the re-
quests of two SOX-regulated U.S. multinationals, McDonald's and Exide Technologies, to
run whistleblower hotlines in France. 75 The CNIL declined the companies' requests on
the ground that their proposed denunciation systems violated France's data protection
law.76
74. For examples of U.S.-authored discussions of the French guidelines and the EU advisory opinion on
SOX whistleblower hotlines but that do not address the positions in the other seven member states, see,
Dowling, Jr., SOX Hotlines Raise Legal Issues in Europe, INSIGHT (Labor Law Reports) (CCH), No. 922, June 28,
2006; Donald C. Dowling, Jr., European SOX Compliance After McDonald's and Wal-Mart, THE CORPORATE
COUNSELOR, (LJN, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2005, at 1. See also, David Bender, Whistleblower Debate: Anony-
mous Reporting Versus E.U. Data Protection Laws, 235 N.Y. LJ. 5 (2006); James R. Beyer & E. Johan Lubbe,
Clash of the Titans: Complying with U.S. Whistleblowing Requirements While Respecting EU Privacy Rights, ACC
DOCKET Apr. 2006 at 22-36; John Gibeaut, Culture Clash: Other Countries Don't Embrace Sarbanes or America's
Reverence of Whistle-Blowers, A.B.A., at 10; Cynthia L. Jackson, Overreaching Global Codes of Conduct Can Violate
the Law, EuroWatch, Feb. 28, 2007; JeremyJosephs, Blowing the Whistle French-Style, SHRM GLOBAL Focus
on-line, http://www.shrm.org (May 2006); see also Reilly & Nassauer, supra note 6; Starr & Timner, supra
note 1; Thomson; supra note 2.
75. McDonald's, CNIL Dilibiration No. 2005-110 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.theworldlaw
group.com/newsletter/details.asp?ID=1243287122005 (English translation) (last visited Jan. 7, 2005); Exide
Technologies, CNIL DEliberation. No. 2005-111 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.theworldlaw
grouppp.com/newsletter/details.asp?ID=1243487122005 (English translation) (last visited Jan. 7, 2005). For
discussions of these two cases, see, for example, Thompson, supra note 2, at 271-74; Pulina Whitaker, Mul-
tinationals Dance to Two Whistleblowing Tunes, THE EUROPEAN LAW., (Oct. 2007) available at htp://www.
europeanlawyer.co.uk/article_58.html.
76. See supra note 78.
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French data law 77 requires that companies processing personal data (about identifiable
individuals, including employees) first declare their data processing systems to the French
CNIL agency.78 This is called the "declaration procedure." 79 Separately, French data law
also requires that data processors first get affirmative CNIL permission to process special
data, such as hotline denunciation reports that could "exclude" a person-the
whistleblower's target-from the "benefit" of a "contract," such as an employment agree-
ment.80 This is called the "authorization procedure." 8 In other words, employers oper-
ating in France must disclose ("declare") to the CNIL all their employee data processing
systems.8 2 But special systems like SOX hotlines that could affect someone's job status
("exclude" an employee from the "benefit" of an employment "contract") also presump-
tively need affirmative CNIL prior approval ("authorization").8 3
In McDonald's and Exide Technologies, the CNIL refused to authorize these two compa-
nies' proposed U.S.-style anonymous SOX-compliant hotlines, ruling that the proposed
hotlines would threaten privacy rights of whistleblowers' denounced victims. 84 The pro-
posed hotlines could deprive the targets of their right to be told the denunciations against
them and of a procedure to prove their innocence.s5
A few months after the CNIL's McDonald's and Exide Technologies double ruling, on
September 15, 2 005, a French court-the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Libourne-decided
a very similar case the same way.86 But this case rests on general French employment law
and due process principles-not specifically on data privacy law. In SAS BSN GlassPack,
8 7
the Libourne court ruled a former unit of Owens-Illinois had violated French law when it
rolled out a SOX hotline in France.88 The court found GlassPack's hotline "dispropor-
77. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, amended by Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004 [hereinafter "French
Data Law"]. An English version of the French data law is available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/docu-
ments/. Because France's 2004 adoption of the EU data directive was tacked onto this preexisting 1978 data
protection law, French data privacy law has some unique features that differ from data laws in other EU
jurisdictions. As to penalties for violating French data laws generally, after non-compliance following a warn-
ing, an employer in France can be fined up to C150,000 and can be subject to an injunction against further
violations. A subsequent violation within 5 years can be fined up to C300,000 and can also be a criminal
violation. Also, adverse data privacy rulings in Europe often bring serious public relations repercussions.
78. See French Data Law, supra note 77, art. 25.
79. See id.
80. See id., art. 25(4). This "exclude a person from entitlement to a contract" standard comes from French
law, not from the EU data directive, and therefore is essentially unique to France. Compare id., with Direc-
tive, supra note 68.
81. See French Data Law, supra note 77, art. 25.
82. Id.
83. See French Data Law, supra note 77, art. 25. A SOX hotline, of course, could affect the job status of any
employee who is the subject of a whistleblower's complaint. A lot has been written on the French data law
interpretation of SOX hotlines. See also supra note 74.
84. See McDonald's and Eride Technologies, supra note 75.
85. SOX policies commonly retain employer control and confidentiality over internal investigations; to the
CNIL, these internal investigations might look little different from a secret trial where the prosecutor
doubles as judge. The cultural factor in play here is that in the U.S., internal investigations are a good
corporate governance "best practice," whereas "the tradition in Europe [is for] workplace accusations [to be]
conducted more like a trial." Josephs, supra note 74.
86. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Libourne, Sept. 15, 2005,
no. 05/00143 [hereinafter GlassPack].
87. Id.
88. The GlassPack company had indeed launched its hotline as a SOX compliance measure. Id.
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tionate" because it allowed anonymous whistleblowing on "fraud or theft" (hotlines open
to general theft allegations are a U.S. best practice but exceed the SOX Section 301 man-
date8 9), and thereby endangered the "individual liberties" of potential whistleblowing
targets. 90
The McDonald's, Exide Technologies, and GlassPack decisions ignited a minor interna-
tional incident: SOX-regulated multinationals saw the French position as forcing them
into an impossible bind, and so they complained to French authorities and to the S.E.C. in
the United States.91 This is the furor that was written up in the Wall Street Journal, which
published the quote saying "[c]ompanies are being told 'I either have to chop off my left
hand or my right hand.' '"92
The conflict here was so acute that in Spring 2006, Christophe Pallez, then theSecre-
tary-General of the CNIL, met with S.E.C. staff after Ethiopis Tafara, Director of the
S.E.C. Office of International Affairs, corresponded with EU data authorities.93 This
trans-Adantic dialogue on whistleblower hotlines addressed the key issues but did not
reach any formal agreement. 94 Neither the uproar nor even the S.E.C.'s intervention
convinced the CNIL to back down, although hearing the S.E.C.'s point of view seems to
have softened the CNIL to a slightly more flexible position. While the CNIL seemed
convinced that its rulings in McDonald's and Exide Technologies were good law and good
policy, the S.E.C. seems to have shown the CNIL the tight bind that its position placed
SOX-regulated employers.
So on November 10, 2005, the CNIL issued guidelines offering, perhaps, a way out: the
Document d'orientation adopt par la Commission le 10 novembre 2005 pour la mise en oeuvre de
dispositifs d'alerte professionelle.. .95 Although early press reports implied that the Novem-
ber guidelines eliminated the conflict between Section 301 and French data law, in fact
the guidelines adhere closely to the analysis in the CNIL's McDonald's/Exide Technologies
89. See generally supra note 14 (discussing U.S. "best practice" of broad hodines).
90. GlassPack, supra note 86. But this is not to say that all French courts will strike down all whistleblower
hotlines. On September 9, 2006, one French court accepted the hotline of Germany's Bayer CropScience
because it complied with French rules. See, e.g., Union departementale CGT du Rhone v. Bayer CropScience,
Tribunal de grande instance, Lyon [France], Chambre des urgences, Sept. 19, 2006. Bayer is discussed in Erika
C. Collins, Marjorie R. Culver, & Laura Marino, Developments in Employment Law Around the Word, 41 INT'L
LAW. 541, 546 (2007).
91. The French brought the EU advisory Article 29 Working Party into these discussions with the U.S.
S.E.C. See Tfirk (Chairman of the CNlL), supra note 40, at 3. For a fairly detailed (if S.E.C.-centric) sum-
mary of the S.E.C./EU/CNIL Article 29 Working Party dialogue, see generally Bostleman, supra note 3, at
§19.11.2. See also Letter from Peter Schaar, supra note 41.
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Shortly after the international furor erupted over the McDon-
ald's and Eride Technologies cases, supra note 75, the CNIL seems perhaps to have backpedaled a bit. A paper
from the head of the CNIL dated October 3, 2005, for example, said, "It would be wrong to assume that by
issuing these decisions, the CNIL intended to prohibit all forms of anonymous reporting within compa-
nies..." Report from Christophe Pallez, Secretary-General of CNIL, to Data Protection Research & Policy
Group, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, SOX and Whistleblowing Hotlines: Dutifid
Employee or Informer/A Discussion on the Latest CNIL Decision Concerning "Whistleblowing Hotlines" and Their
Legality Under Data Protection Legislation, (Oct. 3, 2005), at 3 (nine page unpublished paper).
93. See supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. CNIL, Guideline Document for the Implementation of Whistieblowing Systems [hereinafter "Guide-
lines"](Paris, Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.CNTL.fr/fileadmin/documents/UK/CNIL-recommendations-whis-
tleblowing-VA.pdf.
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cases,
96 
and make reconciling SOX hotlines with French law almost as tough a challenge
as under McDonalds/Exide Technologies.
Under these November guidelines it appears theoretically possible to set up a "confi-
dential, anonymous" hotline in France that complies with Section 301 and that the CNIL
would approve under its "authorization" procedure-but only if the SOX-regulated hot-
line sponsor were willing to tailor a whistleblowing system in France that became radically
different from "best practices hotlines" under SOX. To get CNIL "authorization" ap-
proval under the November guidelines, an employer would have to restructure a U.S.
"best practices" hotline by implementing safeguards for accused wrongdoers that would
render the resulting hotline substantially less effective, from a U.S. point of view. The
CNIL's rules, under its November guidelines:
* require limiting hotlines to accept only complaints of audit/accounting fraud and
bribery (no whistleblowing on harassment, petty theft, safety violations)
0 forbid mandatory reporting rules that require whistleblowing (any employee who
catches a co-worker committing fraud retains a right to remain silent)
* forbid or severely restrict communicating that the hotline will accept anonymous
calls (hotlines may in fact accept anonymous calls, but communications about hot-
lines, and hotline operators, must urge whistleblowers to self-identify-and to the
CNIL, any mention whatsoever in a company's employee communications about its
hotline revealing that hotline operators will take anonymous calls is improper en-
couragement of anonymous reporting9 7)
0 require notifying accused wrongdoers immediately, as soon as evidence is pre-
served (tipping off targets well before completing the investigation)
* require destroying files of all hotline calls that do not result in discipline or litiga-
tion, generally within two months9s
96. McDonald's and Exide Techs. supra note 75. The guidelines in theory allow the "confidential, anony-
mous" hotlines mandated by SOX § 301. Guidelines, supra note 95. While the guidelines severely restrict
"anonymity" as understood under American-style hotline systems, they do allow anonymous calls under some
circumstances, discussed infra. Id. Compliance with the French guidelines likely would be held sufficient for
SOX § 301 purposes (see S.E.C. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, srupra note 17).
To this extent, especially in light of the sovereignty issue, a U.S. court adjudicating § 301 compliance abroad
(assuming § 301 extends abroad in the first place, see supra Part 1) should be sensitive to French sovereignty
and to the compulsion of foreign law. On the sovereignty issue, see supra note 27.
97. The CNIL November guidelines say a hotline can accept anonymous calls, but employee communica-
tions about a hotline cannot "encourage" whistleblowers to remain anonymous. Guidelines, supra note 95. At
first blush, that tells American companies that their hotline communications in France need to say something
along the lines of "while our hotline will accept anonymous calls, anonymity is not encouraged." But in fact the
CNIL sees even an employee communication like that as improperly encouraging whistleblowers to remain
anonymous, and as such illegal. The CNIL, in fact, takes the position that any mention in employee commu-
nications that a hotline operator would listen to an anonymous caller is improper "encourage[mentl." While
that interpretation is not spelled out in CNIL guidelines, it is commonly understood among data privacy
experts in France to be the CNIL position because the CNIL has taken that position orally on a number of
occasions. For example, two agents of the CNIL confirmed to the author and an audience of about 60 others
that this is indeed the CNIL interpretation; this confirmation came in response to the author's question on
this precise point during a conference session in Paris on March 2, 2007, at which the two CNTrL agents were
panel speakers. Annual meeting of XBHR, Paris, France, Maison de l'Amerique Latine (March 2, 2007), http://
www.xbhr.com/pages/conferences.php.
98. Guidelines, supra note 95. In summary, to get CNIL "authorization" approval under the November
guidelines, a French hotline must follow 12 rules:
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Additionally, hodines based in the United States-that is, procedures through which
whistleblowers have to communicate with someone outside of the EU,99 such as on U.S.-
based outsourced hodines' 00-raise the separate problem of out-of-EU data transfers,
which the EU data directive regulates under its Articles 25 and 26.101 If hotline calls or e-
mails get answered at U.S. headquarters, or if they get answered by a U.S. (or other
1. Limit reportable offenses to audit/accounting fraud; this means that likely, which cannot be
the subject of the hotline, include: employment discrimination/harassment, ethics policy viola-
tions, antitrust issues, and possibly even bribery;
2. Eliminate any rule requiring employees who witness fraud to make a report (SOX does not
technically require such a rule, but these rules are a common U.S. best practice);
3. Articulate "categories of personnel likely to be incriminated" (who will likely be the subject of
whistieblower denunciations);
4. Keep each whistleblower's identity confidential, do not retaliate, and maintain the target's
(alleged wrongdoer's) identity as confidential as possible;
5. Tell eligible hotline users: names of individuals who will receive complaints; scope of the hot-
line; that there is no mandatory obligation to report information such that you act as a
whistleblower; that employees have a right of access to hotiine information about themselves and
a way to rectify incorrect information; that abuse in whistleblowing gives rise to disciplinary/legal
sanctions against the individual whistleblower; that no sanctions will imposed against a
whistleblower if the allegations are challenged but the whistleblower acted in good faith;
6. "Encourage" whistleblowers to self-identify, and communicate this "encourage[ment]" as part
of the hodine description;
7. Establish a "dedicated" system for receiving complaints, with "trained" personnel communi-
cating on a need-to-know basis;
8. In recording complaints (hotline notes), write up only necessary alleged facts, and make clear
that these are merely allegations;
9. If hotiine data are transferred outside of the EU (such as to U.S. headquarters or to a U.S.
hotine), ensure the transmission is under an approved method (e.g., safe harbor; model contrac-
tual clauses); if data go onward to a third party (e.g., outsourced), there must be a data contract;
10. If a whistleblower's report is held unfounded, destroy the file "immediately"; if "verification"
is required, destroy file after two months, unless disciplinary or court proceedings are pending;
11. Inform the target (alleged wrongdoer) "as soon as data... [are] recorded" about the com-
plaint-however, taking preemptive "protective measures" is permitted;
12. Ensure all individuals named/identified in a "whistleblower's" report have the right to ob-
serve "his or her" data in the file (redacting others' names).
99. Or outside the tiny handful of non-European countries that the EU deems offer "adequate protec-
tions," notably including Argentina and Canada. See DOWLING, JR. & MITTAIAN, supra note 71, § 14:3.1.
100. In recent years the hotline trend has spawned a mini-industry of outsourced hotline operators, said to
include more than 100 outsource hodine-answering companies. Cf. Starr & Timner, supra note 1 ("anony-
mous telephone 'hotlines' are now common"). Many of those companies answer their hodines in the United
States. To address the out-of-EU data transmission problem, many of the companies claim to be safe harbor
self-certified (as to what "safe harbor" is, see DOWLING, JR. & MrrTMAN, supra note 71, § 14:3.2). But a
multinational customer of any such hotline needs to ensure that, even if the hotiine operator has a valid safe
harbor self-certification, the transmission of hotline call information from the U.S. hotline operator over to
the customer's U.S. headquarters complies with EU data law, that transmission could not possibly shelter
under the hodine provider's safe harbor. At least one outsource hotiine provider, Wackenhut, sidesteps this
problem by hosting a hotline call center in Belgium and reports hodine calls to its customers' Europe-side
personnel. Also, of course, hotiine customers should understand that, at best, a hotline provider's safe harbor
addresses the discrete issue of transmitting hotline calls outside the EU. But a hotline provider's safe harbor
self-certification does nothing as to the more central EU data law issues discussed in this article. See infra
note 235.
101. See DOWLING, JR. & MrTrMAN, supra note 71, § 14:3.
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outside-EU102) outsourced hotline company, then to comply with EU law the hotline
system must meet the requirements of "safe harbor," "model contracts," or "binding cor-
porate rules." 103 Further, any "onward transfer" of hotline-received information from an
outsourced hotline company over to the employer must separately comply.104
A month after issuing these November 2005 guidelines, the CNIL took an unexpected
step when, on December 8, 2005, it issued a completely separate set of SOX-hotline
guidelines under its declaration procedure. 05 The CNIL's December guidelines are sub-
stantively similar to its November guidelines and expressly refer back to and incorporate
the November guidelines. But procedurally the December guidelines let employers
launch a SOX hotline in France without awaiting cumbersome CNIL authorization
merely by self-certifying compliance.
Under the December guidelines, an employer need merely report (self-certify) to the
CNIL, on-line, that it has set up a hotline that qualifies for the December guidelines'
blanket pre-authorization. Therefore, since December 2005, an employer can now roll
out a French SOX hotline with no prior CNIL permission at all merely by making an on-
line declaration notice to the CNIL saying it has crafted a hotline and whistleblowing
policy consistent with the December guidelines. 0 6 Surprisingly, while the December
guidelines offer companies a simpler procedure than their November counterpart, they
are not significantly more onerous. In fact, while the November guidelines impose twelve
substantive mandates,10 7 the December rules impose only ten. s0 8 However, both sets of
102. Or outside the tiny handful of non-European countries that the EU deems to have "adequate protec-
tions," notably including Argentina and Canada. See id. § 14:3.1.
103. See id. § 14:3; see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr. & Jeremy Mittman, European Data Protection Law and
U.S.-Based Multinational Banks: A Compliance Primer Part 1, 12 No. 6 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. I
(July/Aug. 2007); Donald C. Dowling, Jr. & Jeremy Mittman, European Data Protection Law and U.S. Based
Multinational Banks: A Compliance Primer Part 2, 12 No. 7 ELEC. BANKrNG L. & Com. REP. 2, 1 (Sept. 2007).
104. This raises an under-diagnosed problem: Too often, hotline outsourcers based in the United States
market their services to European employee populations by saying they are "safe harbor" certified. But even
where there is a safe harbor certification in place, it does not authorize the data transmission, in the United
States, of hodine call data from the outsourcer to its client in the United States See DOWUrNG, JR. &
MrvmA', supra note 71, and infra note 235.
105. CNIL, Autorisation unique no A U-004, Deliberation No. 2005-305 du 8 Decembre 2005 portant autorisation
unique de traitements automatises. . ., O.J. no. 3, Jan. 4, 2006 [hereinafter Autorisation]. See generally Erika C.
Collins, Marjorie R. Culver & Kenji Hosokawa, Developments in Employment Law around the World, 40 INr'L
LAW. 649, 658 (2006).
106. Obviously the burden is on the employer actually to comply with the December guidelines. A hotline
and whistieblowing policy notified to the CNIL under the December guidelines but later found to be in
violation of those guidelines of course violates French law. Also, a hotline operator transmitting data abroad
(say, to U.S. headquarters) or to third parties (say, to a hotline operator in the U.S.) must comply with EU
data law on "onward transfers" and overseas data transmissions, such as via safe harbor, model contracts, or
binding corporate rules. See DOWLING, JR. & MrrrAVA, supra note 71, § 14:3.
107. These twelve mandates are listed supra at note 98. However, the December guidelines incorporate and
include the November guidelines as an annex, so to that extent, the November guidelines remain a part of the
December guidelines.
108. To qualify for blanket-pre-approval from CNIL under the December guidelines, in summary, an em-
ployer must take ten steps:
1. Limit the hotline to financial, accounting, banking, and anti-bribery whistieblowing only.
2. Get the whistleblower to identify himself, except an anonymous complaint is acceptable if (i)
extra "precautions" are taken, and (ii) the employer does not publicize that complaints may be
anonymous, and encourages whisdeblowers to self-identify.
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rules impose obligations that go beyond what the typical U.S.-based multinational would
normally build into a Section 301 whistleblower hotline that complies with U.S. "best
practices."
Summary chart #2
Comparison of French whistleblower guidelines of 2005
November 2005 CNIL guide- December 2005 CNIL guide-
Topic lines lines
When hotline Hotline OK only if other tools Not mentioned
allowed not effective under the circum-
stances. Hotline must comple-
ment other tools.
Scope of hot- Hotline must be limited in Whistleblowing system must be
line scope. A hotline with indis- limited to: (1) financial, (2)
criminate scope (e.g., covering accounting, (3) banking, and (4)
breaches of corporate policies anti-bribery (including SOX
or codes of business conduct) compliance).
raises serious problems. Hot-
lines limited in scope will
receive CNIL authorization
only if other CNIL-recom-
mended rules are respected.
Whistleblowing should not be
compulsory for employees (no
mandatory whistleblowing rule).
3. Data collected are strictly limited to necessary information.
4. Data are collected by and communicated to only the circle of those with a need to know.
"External Service Providers" must comply with these restrictions.
5. Transfers of whistleblower data outside the EU must comply with the "onward transfer" re-
strictions of applicable data law ("safe harbor," "model contracts," "binding corporate rules").
6. Report file must be destroyed immediately, or stored longer only as necessary for an active
investigation.
7. Strong data security, including "passwords," is necessary for stored and transmitted data.
8. The whistleblowing system must be limited, and communicated according to set rules.
9. The target must be notified of the complaint "as soon as the data is [sic] recorded," or as soon
as "protective measurers' are "implemented" to prevent the destruction of evidence.
10. The target gets access to the report, except the whistleblower's identity remains confidential.
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Role of data Employee communications Those with access to hotline
about hotline should say hotline calls, including outsourced ser-
(employer oper- is only for specific topics vice providers, must be limited,
ating hotline) allowed. Hotline should reject need-to-know, trained, and
whistleblower calls received on bound by confidentiality.
other topics, unless a
whistleblower call implicates
company's or employees' vital
interests.
Restrictive Keep whistleblower's identity Keep whistleblowers' identities
processing of confidential to ensure against confidential. Encourage
whistleblower retaliation. Do not tell target whistleblowers to self-identify.
reports who denounced him. OK to Exceptions (anonymous
accept anonymous reports, whistleblower OK) only if: (1)
although those are disfavored. Special precautions taken as to
Encourage whistleblowers to anonymous reports, and (2)
identify themselves and to offer organization does not encourage
data related to facts, rather than anonymity in whistleblowing
data related to persons. and employee communications
account for this.
Employee com- Communicate clear and exten- In addition to information that
munications sive information to potential the French labor code requires
whistleblowers about the hot- communicating, also commumi-
line. Tell employees: who runs cate clear and complete infor-
hotline; purpose/scope of hot- mation: who runs hotline;
line; its optional nature (not objectives; sectors affected by
mandatory); employees will not alerts; optional nature of the
be punished for not using it; system (not mandatory); no
who receives reports; incrimi- consequences for employees
nated individuals can access and who do not use hotline; who
rectify their data; abuse of sys- receives alerts; possible personal
tem may result in discipline and data transfers outside of the
criminal proceedings; good faith European Union; existence of
but inaccurate reports will not right to access and correct
result in sanctions, available for those accused;
abuse of system may result in
disciplinary action and criminal
proceedings; good faith but
inaccurate statements will not
result in sanctions.
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Collecting Whistleblower reports may be Facts collected must be strictly
reports and collected by any data processing limited to areas covered by hot-
fact means, whether electronic or line. Other facts can be
not. processed only if they affect
vital interests or physical/moral
integrity of employees.
Relevant. ade- Hotline should only record Analysis of a whistleblower's
qua~te and objective data directly related to report may rely only on objec-
nonexcessive hotline scope and strictly tive data directly related to hot-
data in reports required for verifying alleged line scope and strictly required
facts. for verifying alleged facts.
Duty to notify November Guidelines, Authori- December Guidelines, Declara-
or get permis- zation procedure: affirmative tion procedure: duty to notify
sion permission required CNIL, but no permission
needed
Who processes A compliance team should run Communicate reports need-to-
reports the hotline. Limit who can see know only. Transfers of per-
reports. Train. Require confi- sonal data out-of-EU must be
dentiality. Communicate data need-to-know and follow data
collected only need-to-know. If law on out-of-EU transfers.
disclosure is required outside
EU, comply with data law on
out-of-EU data transmissions.
Deletin Immediately delete file after Immediately delete or "archive"
whisdeblower finding a report unsubstanti- data outside hotline scope
report files ated. As to data needing verifi- unless otherwise provided by
cation, delete 2 months after law. Destroy or "archive" data
case closes, unless disciplinary needing verification within 2
action or court proceedings months of case closing, unless
pending. disciplinary/legal proceedings
pending.
Accurate infor- Notify target as soon as possi- Notify target as soon as possi-
mation to ble. Allow prompt rebuttal. If ble. Allow prompt rebuttal. If
incriminated indispensable protective mea- indispensable protective mea-
sures are needed to preserve sures are needed to preserve
evidence, take immediate mea- evidence, take immediate mea-
sures, then communicate to tar- sures, then communicate to tar-
get. get.
France's November and December guidelines, detailed as they are, nevertheless leave
open a number of questions. To answer them, on March 1, 2006, the CNIL issued yet
another set of guidelines, this time called "frequently asked questions" ("FAQs"), 10 9 flesh-
109. CNIL, FAQ mr les dispositif d'alerte professionnelle, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id= 1982.
VOL. 42, NO. 1
DIRECTIONS THROUGH THE MAZE 29
ing out what the two sets of guidelines actually mean. The CNIL's FAQs address topics
including:
* what hotlines are, under the CNIL definition (FAQ #1)
* how to "declare" a hotline to CNIL (FAQ #3)
* interplay of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley (FAQ #4)
* how legally to make an anonymous tip (FAQ #12)
* who can use hotlines (FAQ #13)
* interplay with the duty of confidentiality under data protection law (FAQ #18)
* interplay with ethics codes (FAQ #20)10
France has not issued much news on the SOX hotline front since its FAQs, and so the
state of the law in France on SOX hodines has been mostly stable since early 2006.111 As
we will see, however, France's strict position had a deep influence on law in other Euro-
pean jurisdictions-including on an important opinion on this issue from an advisory EU
body.
B. THE NETHERLANDS
On January 16, 2006, just weeks after the French guidelines were issued, the Dutch
Personal Data Protection Board (College Bescherming Persoongegevens) entered the hotline
debate with a detailed whistleblowing recommendation responding to a private company's
request for permission to launch a hotline.112 The Dutch recommendation appears to be
persuasive but non-binding authority, akin to a U.S. Internal Revenue Service letter
ruling.
According to the Dutch recommendation, and consistent with the position of the
French CNIL, whistleblowing hotlines should supplement, but not replace, organic
Dutch reporting channels. 1 3 The Dutch (and common European) view here is that hot-
lines cannot become an Americanized end-run around all the well-evolved so-called "al-
ternate reporting channels" in European workplaces, channels like ombudsmen, individual
worker representatives, health and safety committees, local (national and "enterprise")
110. Id. But one issue that even France's Frequently Asked Questions do not fully address is whether compli-
ance with CNIL guidelines will be deemed sufficiently "proportionate" to meet the standards of the French
SAS BSN GlassPack court case, supra note 86-which did not turn on data protection law analysis.
11. However, the following month, the Chairman of France's CNIL issued a fairly-detailed 4-page position
paper summarizing the French position. See Tiirk (Chairman of CNIL), supra note 40. See also Bayer, supra
note 90.
112. Recommendation on Request for Permission, as per Art. 77, Par. 2 WBP, available at http://wvw.
globalcompliance.com/pdf/dutch-data-protection-english-translation.pdf [hereinafter "Dutch Recommenda-
tion"] . All European states have adopted ("transposed") a common template data law, or "directive." See
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 68. So data privacy laws similar to France's exist across Europe. While
Americans might seem quick to assume that local data laws in Europe are almost exactly the same from
country to country, in practice each EU member state's data statute, although similar to the others, is unique
in key respects. And each data protection agency in Europe has every bit as much power locally as France's
CNIL or the Dutch College Bescherming Persoongegevens to interpret its local data law. The result is that the
European states go their own ways, especially as to application of data privacy law to the whistleblower
hotlines.
113. Dutch Recommendation, supra note 112, at 4.
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works councils, 114 European Works Councils, trade union representatives, government
labor bureaucracies, DPAs, and even the in-house company chain-of-command. Prefer-
ring that employees use these alternate channels for their quotidian complaints, the Dutch
Data Board would limit hotlines to reports of only substantial abuses that rise above the
"subsidiary level."
In addition, the Dutch Data Board's recommendation guarantees due process rights to
whistleblowers' incriminated targets, rights that an employer should spell out in the hot-
line communications package. The Dutch recommendation would also have hotline com-
munications discourage anonymous denunciations, allowing them only in exceptional
cases) 15 In that regard, the Dutch Data Board apparently would require a hotline opera-
tor to hang up on any anonymous whistleblower calling to report a mundane, as opposed
to an exceptional, wrong. Separately (and apparently unconcerned about the scope of its
jurisdiction) the Dutch Data Board reminds employers to seek their works councils' writ-
ten consent for any whistleblower hotline.
.A unique feature of the Dutch recommendation is that it actually steers employers to
use specialized third-party outsource hotline vendors for taking whistleblowers' calls. 116
Many other EU jurisdictions seem skeptical of outsource hotline vendors, and those mem-
ber states direct employers to train in-house hotline teams. Of course, however,
whistleblower calls to a third-party hotline vendor must comply with the Dutch Personal
Data Protection Act. To that extent, the Dutch recommendation expressly favors local
European hotline vendors over anyone answering phones in the states. n 7 Under the
Dutch recommendation, whistleblower calls and report data leaving the EU (such as to a
U.S. outsourced hotline vendor) are improper unless "it is clear that any handling of the
report cannot appropriately occur at a lower level."" s That is, as to calls to an out-of-
Europe "parent company," a Dutch hotline can only accept reports of "substantial abuses"
rising above the "subsidiary level."" 9
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION ARTICLE 29 WORKIN G PARTY
The EU's Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is an advisory, EU-level body
comprised of data privacy officers from the member states charged with advising on EU
data protection law. 120 On February 1, 2006, just two weeks after the Dutch recommen-
dation, the Working Party issued a non-binding, 18-page "Opinion 1/2006 on the Appli-
cation of EU Data Protection Rules to Internal Whistleblowing Schemes in the Field of
Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls, Auditing Matters, Fight against Bribery,
114. On works councils in Europe, see supra Part II.
115. Dutch Recommendation, supra note 112, at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
117. Id. at 7. To this extent, while the Dutch recommendation favors using outsource hotline providers, it
disfavors using U.S. outsourced hotline providers that answer calls in the United States. For a discussion of
strategy as to outside-EU hotline call transmissions, see infra Part IV(J) at bullet "Insulate hotline call data
transmissions outside the EU."
118. Dutch Recommendation, ntpra note 106, at 7.
119. Id.
120. The "Article 29" in the Working Party's tide refers to Article 29 of the EU data protection directive,
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 68, which calls for establishing an EU-level data protection advisory group.
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Banking and Financial Crime.' 2' This opinion is not aimed at audit committees of indi-
vidual SOX-regulated issuers that sponsor hotlines; rather, it is addressed to the DPAs, the
national data privacy bureaucracies around Europe. It remains the only formal EU-level
guidance the DPAs have on the whistleblower hodine/data law issue, and as we will see,
this opinion has indeed proved widely influential among the DPAs. For an individual
multinational sponsoring a hotline, the opinion's chief importance is the extent that it
previews the future direction of those member state DPAs that have, as yet, issued no
guidance on hodines.
Perhaps it surprised no one when the content of the Article 29 Working Party's opinion
proved to track the strict French and Dutch positions fairly closely, particularly the
French. The Working Party's opinion implicitly ratifies the French CNIL's interpreta-
tion of data law, at least in principle. Without taking quite as hard-line a position as the
CNIL had, the opinion limits its consideration to those hotlines that accept calls only
about audit/accounting fraud and bribery (the Working Party deferred taking any position
on hotlines that accept calls on other offenses). In its opinion, the Working Party
addresses:
* "protection of the person incriminated through a whistleblowing scheme" (Sec. II)
• "assessment of the compatibility of whistleblowing schemes with data protection
rules" (Sec. V)
* "provision of clear and complete information about the scheme" (Sec. IV(3))
* "rights of the incriminated person" (Sec. IV(4))
* "security of processing operations" (Sec. 1V(5))
* "management of whistleblowing schemes" (Sec. IV(6))
* "transfers to third countries" (Sec. LV(7))
* "compliance with notification requirement" (Sec. IV(8))122
In essence, the Article 29 Working Party opinion recommends an only slightly watered-
down version of the French requirements.123 The Working Party opinion favors in-house
hotlines over those outsourced, and it discourages any hodines that accept anonymous
calls other than in exceptional circumstances. Although the Working Party's opinion is
not binding (the U.K., for one, does not fully follow it),124 the Working Party is extremely
influential among the DPAs in part because the Working Party is itself a group of DPA
representatives. At least five European states-Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg,
and Spain-joined France and the Netherlands and followed Working Party's recommen-
dations. Other member states can be expected to follow suit.
121. Opinion on the Application of the EU Data Protection Rules to Internal Whistleblowing Schemes in the Fields of
Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls, Auditing Matters, Fight Against Bribery, Banking and Financial Crime,
Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2006, 00195/06 WP 117 (Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter "Art. 29 Working
Party Opinion"]. Further explication of this opinion appears in the detailed letter from the Working Party's
chairman Peter Schaar to the U.S. S.E.C. Schaar, supra note 41. For an analysis of Article 29 Working Party
Opinion 2006, see Bruce Zargis, Working Party Issues Opinion on Application of EU Data Protection Rules to
Internal Whistleblowing Schemes in the Context of Accounting and Financial Crime, 22 IN. COOPERATION AND
ECON. LN.F EGR'I'1N No. 1 (May 2006); Renzo Marchini, Conflict of Laws: Anonymous Wbistleblowing Hotlines
Under Sarbanes-Oxley and European Data Protection Laws," 2006 PRIVACY & DATA SEC. L. J. 575 (May 2006);
Whitaker, supra note 75. See also citations supra note 74.
122. Art. 29 Working Party Opinion, supra note 121.
123. Available at http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=303.
124. See infra Part IV(E).
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D. IRELAND
On March 6, 2006, just over a month after the Article 29 Working Party opinion issued,
Ireland specifically endorsed the Working Party's approach to whistleblower hotlines
when it posted on its web page its "Whistleblower Schemes and Compliance with the U.S.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act."' 25 This post made Ireland the very first EU DPA to buy into the
Working Party's opinion. For a common-law jurisdiction like Ireland to accept the Work-
ing Party's approach might have seemed surprising, but the Irish Data Protection Com-
missioner, for years, has leaned toward the Continental view on a number of data law
issues.
Ireland's Data Commissioner threw a curve ball, however, when it pitched its recom-
mendations to a wildly-impractical suggestion that employers create double-anonymous
whistleblower hotline systems whereby both whistleblower and target (as well as other
witnesses) go unnamed and unidentifiable. The Irish Data Commissioner correctly notes
that any such double-anonymous whistleblower set-up would sidestep data privacy law
entirely (because any hotline operator's notes of a double-anonymous denunciation would
contain no personally-identifiable data, and as such would be unregulated). What the Irish
Data Commissioner neglects to say is the obvious: most any double-anonymous denuncia-
tion, assuming the whistleblower somehow keeps his putative target both unnamed and
genuinely unidentifiable (as would be necessary for the denunciation to sidestep data pro-
tection law), would be so completely inscrutable as possibly to fall short of the "proce-
dures" mandated by Section 301.126
The Irish recommendation, however, does grant that employers might, in the alterna-
tive, institute regular systems where anonymous whistleblowers name their denounced
wrongdoers, although in Ireland anonymous-whistleblower-with-named-target reporting
is "not encouraged." It is in this regard that the Irish recommendation more or less buys
into the strictures of the Article 29 Working Party Opinion.' 27 Notably, as to hotline
scope, the Irish recommendation is looser than the Working Party opinion in that it lets
whistleblowers report infractions of a deeper pool of laws or rules (beyond audit/account-
ing fraud and bribery) as long as the employer's hotline communication package had pre-
viously spelled out which specific infractions are reportable, and as long as the employer
had previously designated both who can whistleblow and whom a whistleblower can
denounce. 128
E. UNn-ED KINGDOM
Almost as soon as the SOX whistleblower hotline battle broke out in France, the U.K.
jumped in seeming to side with the Americans. Early but informal word that leaked from
125. "Whistleblower" Schemes and Compliance with U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdf
app/download-blob?idpdf=f-20061129-7 [hereinafter "Irish Recommendation"].
126. See supra Part I. If a SOX-regulated multinational's internal whistleblower "procedures" prohibited
whistleblowers from naming or even giving personally-identifiable information about wrongdoers de-
nounced, the denunciations would be so useless as to invite SOX § 301 challenge, even notwithstanding the
broad discretion employers have under § 301 in structuring their hotlines. See S.E.C. Standards supra note
17.
127. Art. 29 Working Party Opinion, supra note 121, art. 29.
128. Irish Recommendation, supra note 125.
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the U.K.'s DPA, the Information Commissioner's Office, was that the British actually
encourage whistleblowing by law, the often-cited U.K. Public Interest Disclosure Act
1998,129 and therefore, unlike the French, do not interpret their data protection law to
obstruct SOX-style hotlines. According to an early (September 2005) report in the Wall
Street Journal: 130
In the United Kingdom, which has more companies with U.S. stock-market listings
than any other EU country, the Information Commissioner's Office doesn't "see any-
thing wrong with these hot lines," a spokeswoman said. As long as companies con-
duct a proper investigation into any whistle-blower allegation and the accused is
informed and has due-process rights, such hot lines shouldn't pose problems, she
added. But British laws could be breached if a company took an anonymous tip "at
face value" without conducting an impartial investigation.13 1
The Wall Street Journal write-up seems to have influenced what American companies
quickly came to see as the U.K.'s position on the hotline issue: contrarian to the Conti-
nental European (and Irish) view, fairly well-aligned with SOX, and friendly to American
"best practices" hotlines. 132
However, after the Wall Street Journal and other Americans perhaps stopped paying
close attention, the U.K. Information Commissioner seems to have, to some extent, gone
native, or at least eased into a more nuanced position closer to the Continental view. The
U.K. has not yet issued any formal guidance on the hotline/data protection issue, but an
obscure U.K. position paper from April 2006, seven months after the Wall Street Journal
report, pulls back from a lusty British embrace of American-style anonymous hotlines.
On the anonymity issue, this non-binding U.K. paper, "Whistleblowing in the U.K." (a
two-page U.K. Information Commissioner's Office summary offered to the 2006 Spring
Conference of European Data Protection Authorities), 133 almost seems to play to a Conti-
nental audience, declaring:
129. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/uk
pgq 19980023_en_1.html. The often-cited U.K. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, however, does not
mandate employer whistleblower hotlines, as SOX § 301 does. See infra quotation in text accompanying note
134. To this extent, the U.K. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998's relevance as to the precise question of
how U.K. protection data law affects employer-sponsored anonymous whistleblower hodines would seem to
be, perhaps, less than direct, and possibly exaggerated.
130. Reilly & Nassauer, supra note 6.
131. Id.
132. For a statement of the typical U.S. view on the U.K. position regarding hotlines, see, e.g., Thompson,
supra note 2, at 278 (if "companies [operating in the U.K.] properly investigate the hotline claims, inform the
accused, and provide the accused due-process rights, the U.K. apparently will continue to not have an issue
[sic] with the hodines"). Part of the reason the U.K. has been seen to take this contrarian view may relate to
an unpublished, undated eight-page paper (apparently from October 3, 2005), "Informal Input to the CNIL
on Anonymous Hotlines," by the non-governmental British Institute of International & Comparative Law's
Data Protection Research and Policy Group. This paper criticized the then-proposed CNIL guidelines point
for point, and implicitly seemed to champion American-style employer-sponsored whistleblowing hotlines as
a U.K. best practice.
133. Whistleblowing in the U.K. (Apr. 6, 2006), unpublished position paper of U.K Information Commis-
sioner's Office for 2006 Spring Conference of European Data Protection Authorities. Another nuanced posi-
tion from the U.K. is reflected in the undated Power Point presentation called "Whistleblowing and Data
Protection: The U.K. Perspective," attributed to David Smith, Deputy Information Commissioner for the
U.K. Information Commissioner's Office. One bullet point in that slideshow says "Whistleblowing can be a
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The [U.K.] Public Interest Disclosure Act [1988, the often-cited U.K. whistleblowing
law] does not encourage the anonymous reporting of information. This is because anony-
mous reporting may raise questions about whether the disclosure was made in good faith.
Anonymous reporting also makes it harder to establish that an employer's action was a repri-
sal for legitimate whistleblowing .. .This anonymous reporting can actually reduce the
protection for the individual.134
Besides criticizing anonymous whistleblowing, the informal U.K. paper takes other po-
sitions that seem scripted for the Continentals. The U.K. paper, for example, lists six
examples of fairly serious offenses on which whistleblowers should be able to report, pre-
sumably discouraging, under the common-law doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alter-
ius, 135 the wide-open, frontier-spirit, big-tent American hotlines that welcome complaints
of sexual harassment, ethical lapses, and even theft of office supplies.136 Flouting U.S.
"best practices," the British paper urges that employers rein in the scope of their hotlines,
setting out "a clear policy about what sort of information it is appropriate to report" and
hence, presumably, not to report. 137
F. LUXEMBOURG
On June 30, 2006 (updated October 11, 2007), Luxembourg's DPA, the Commission
nationale pour la protection des donnies (CNPD), posted on its website a list of fairly tough
rules on whistleblower hotlines.13s The Luxembourg guidelines start from the position of
the Article 29 Working Party Opinion, 139 but in some respects the Luxembourg position
goes even farther. Under the Luxembourg regime, for example, a hotline can cover only
component of effective data protection," but the following bullet point says "Whistleblowing keeps the Infor-
mation Commissioner on his toes!"
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. That is, the old common law canon of construction that to state some things on a list is to exclude those
not listed. See, e.g., Courson v. Courson, 19 Ohio St. 454, 461 (1869).
136. Complaints of sexual harassment, ethical lapses, and theft of office supplies would be reportable on
almost every U.S. "best practices" hotline by definition, to the extent that denying a whistleblower an oppor-
tunity to report actual co-worker infractions violates American hotline "best practices." See supra note 14.
137. Wkistleblowing in the U.K., supra note 133. Supporting this analysis, a recent London Employment
Appeal Tribunal decision holds it would be "perverse" for an employer to discipline an employee based on an
anonymous whistleblower report alone. Corus UK Ltd. v. Mainwaring, UKEAT/0053/07/DM (London,
June 2007), 30; cj 9 46-49. In Cornts, an employer had received an anonymous "tip-off' (id. 4) that a
worker out on leave because of an injured back was fit to work. The employer fired the worker only after an
investigator had videotaped him "loading shopping into the boot of his car in a supermarket car park." Id.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal drew a sharp distinction between discipline based on the original anony-
mous "tip-off' versus discipline based on the subsequent investigation video, but nevertheless remanded to a
lower court for a determination of whether the investigation itself had been "tainted by the mindset," in part
because the company had failed to "take a statement from" the anonymous whistleblower. Id. 9] 13, 48.
Corus shows the U.K Employment Appeal Tribunal skeptical of an anonymous whistleblowing report stand-
ing alone, and even skeptical of a "mindset" "tainted" by an anonymous "tip-off."
138. Whistleblower hotlines pages on CNPD website, June 30, 2006, http://www.cnpd.lu/fr/actualites/ac-
tivitenationale/2006/06/27 06/006/index.html?print [hereinafter "Untitled Luxembourg Hotline
Guidelines"].
139. Supra note 121.
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audit/accounting fraud, banking, and bribery, not other issues. 140 The Luxembourg
guidelines would technically permit anonymous denunciations, but only if employers ac-
tively "discourage" them "to the extent possible." 14 Also, Luxembourg requires employ-
ers with hotlines to sponsor internal "organization[s] specific" for the handling of
whistleblower calls. 142
G. BELGIUM
In November 2006, six months after the Article 29 Working Party opinion, Belgium's
DPA, the Commission de la protection de la vie privee, threw its hat in the hotline ring by
issuing a recommendation 143 that tracks the core ideas of the Article 29 Working Party
opinion' 44 but that adapts them to conditions in the Belgian kingdom. Its main points
include:
an employer must tell employees that any hotline is completely optional (and so
mandatory reporting rules are illegal)145
0 an employer must limit the scope of its hotline only to reports of serious wrongdoing
such as violations of regulations, violations of written company rules, and criminal viola-
tions for which there is no other reporting channel; as such, the employer must close off
the hotline to reports of rumors, suspicions, and anything else short of a serious
violation'46
* an employer must structure a hotline to reject anonymous reports (except in excep-
tional cases) and otherwise actively discourage anonymous whistleblowing4 7
* an employer must explain, and guarantee, due process rights for whistleblowers' de-
nounced targets 48
* an employer must offer advance word to its employees, works council, union repre-
sentative, or bargaining committee before launching any hotline 49
0 an employer must appoint a management representative to receive and process hot-
line denunciations, to this extent, the Belgian position implies that outsourcing a
whistleblower hotline may be illegal' 50
The Belgian recommendation is especially strict as to whistleblower data transfers
outside the EU, such as under any otherwise-permissible hotline answered by a vendor in
the United States, or under any locally-answered hotline where call notes migrate back to
140. Id. The Article 29 Working Party Opinion addresses only hotlines limited to audit/accounting fraud
and bribery, and overtly defers taking any position on broader hotlines. In that regard, the Luxembourg
guidelines go beyond the Article 29 Working Party Opinion, because Luxembourg expressly rules out broader
hotlines.
141. Untitled Luxembourg Hotline Guidelines, supra note 138.
142. Id.
143. Recommandation No 01/2006 du 29 novembre 2006, ref. no. SA2/SE/2006/059, Ojet: Reconmmandation
relative a la compatibilite des systemes d'alerte interne professionnelle avec la loi du 8 decembre 1992 relative a la
protection de la vie privee a I'egard des traitements de donnees a caractere personnel (Belgium).
144. Article 29 Working Party Opinion, snpra note 121.
145. Belgian recommendation, svpra note 143, at 6.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 8.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 8.
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U.S. headquarters. The Belgian position seems to allow such outside-Europe hotline data
transmissions only for serious denunciations, the ramifications of which transcend EU
borders.' 51 Because no one knows in advance the gravity of a report that some
whisdeblower might phone in, this doctrine seems to frustrate a U.S.-based employers'
use of any hotline in the Belgian kingdom that routes straight back to the United States.152
H. GERMANY
Almost two years after the Wal-Mart labor court decision,'53 Germany issued some gui-
dance on the data protection law aspect to whisdeblower hotlines. While other EU mem-
ber states have national data protection agencies, Germany has a state-level privacy regime
with sixteen DPAs, one in each of the Linder (states), leaving the federal German level
with only an informal federal data advisory body (made up of data officers from each
Ldnder) called the Diisseldorfer Kreis. The federal Disseldorfer Kreis has an advisory Ad Hoc
Working Group on Employee Data Protection. On April 20, 2007, this Diisseldorfer Kreis
Ad Hoc Working Group on Employee Data Protection issued a detailed but non-binding
opinion on SOX-style hotlines addressed not to employers but to the sixteen German
Lander DPAs. 154 Broadly speaking, the Diisseldorfer Kreis guidelines follow the Article 29
Working Party hotline opinion,' 55 for example requiring that:
* An employer must limit any whistleblowing hotline to criminal offenses against the
interests of the company (such as fraud, accounting misconduct, corruption, insider
trading, etc.) or, uniquely, conduct that violates human rights or environmental inter-
ests. 156 The hotline should therefore reject whistleblower calls that would merely
report on breaches of company ethics and other routine irregularities. 57
* A hotline should not accept anonymous calls except in exceptional cases. The em-
ployer should discourage anonymous calls.' 58
* The employer of course must safeguard the data privacy rights of a whistleblower's
incriminated target 159
The Diisseldorfer Kreis guidelines expressly decline to opine on the sub-issue of transmit-
ting hotline data outside of EU, such as on a hotline answered in the United States.' 60
151. Id.
152. For a summary of the Belgian position, see, for example, Eva de Walsche & B~n~dicte Raevens, The
Conflict Between U.S. Confidential Whistle Blowing Requirements and EU/Belgian Privacy and Data Protection
Legislation: A Cultural and Legal Clash, THE AMEpICAN LAW., Oct. 2007, at 179 (paid law firm advertisement
not editorial content of The American Lawyer).
153. Wal-Mart, supra note 59.
154. Whistleblowing-Hotlines: Internal Warning Systems and Employee Data Protection; Report of the
Ad-hoc Working Group on "Employee Data Protection" of the Doisselorfer Kreis (Apr. 19-20, 2007), availa-
ble at http://flh.hamburg.de/stadt/Aktuell/weitere-einrichtungen/datenschutzbeauftragter/informationsmate-
rial/ wirtschaft/whisdeblowing-pdfproperty=source.pdf; unofficial English translation produced by World Law
Group, www.theworldlawgroup.com.
155. Article 29 Working Party Opinion, supra note 121.
156. Whistleblowing-Hotlines (German advisory guidelines), supra note 154, § D.2.2.
157. Id.
158. Id. § E.3.
159. Id. § E.4.
160. Id. § A.
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Although the Diisseldorfer Kreis is a data protection body, it appears to have been unable
to resist straying into the labor law arena; its guidelines recommend that employers in-
form and consult with works councils about hotlines, consistent with the German Wal-
Mart decision.' 61 But the Diisseldorfer Kreis goes even farther than the Wal-Mart court in
that it urges employers to "discuss [a hotline proposal] at appropriate times with all parties
involved (e.g., internal auditing, management officers, data protection officers, workers
representative bodies)." 162
I. SPAIN
Spain's DPA, the Agencia Epafola de Protection de Datos (AEDP), has earned a reputation
as Europe's fiercest data-law enforcer. 63 Not surprisingly, then, it was the AEDP that
emerged as the first Southern European DPA to issue a written position on whistleblow-
ing hotlines.' 64 Like the Dutch hotline recommendation and the French McDonald's and
Exide Technologies cases before it,165 the AEDP guidance responds to an inquiry from a
single employer, tailoring a position to the details of that company's actual hotline. 166 As
agency guidance to a single employer, the Spanish report is persuasive authority but not
necessarily binding on others (like a U.S. Internal Revenue Service letter ruling).
In analyzing the specific hotline in front of it,167 the AEDP report invokes the Article
29 Working Party opinion 168 as a starting point but then diverges in key respects, includ-
ing adding an anonymity prohibition that directly conflicts with SOX. The AEDP notes
that the Article 29 Working Party had confined its analysis to those hotlines expressly
limited to audit/accounting fraud, but the actual company system before the AEDP (typi-
cal of U.S. "best practices" hodines) was siguificantly broader. 169 Within this context, the
AEDP report say.
1. Communicate details: Employer explains to employees, in detail, how the hotline
works. 17o
161. Wal-Mart, sopra note 59. Hotlines and works councils are discussed supra Part II.
162. Whistleblowing-Hotlines (German advisory guidelines), smpra note 154, § F (emphasis added).
163. Spain's DPA, unlike those in other member states, is reputed to be self-funded from the fines it collects.
Before 2007, most examples of fines actually imposed in Europe for corporations violating data protection
laws seemed to be examples from Spain, including an early, widely-discussed Spanish fine of Microsoft.
164. Actually, in December 2006 the DPAs of Spain and Portugal collaborated on a position on the hotline
issue, but as of late 2007 Portugal had issued no written guidance other than a broad official communication
from the Portuguese DPA, issued in the wake of the 2006 meeting, announcing that Portugal's interests in
this regard are acute, and are aligned with Spain's.
165. See supra notes 75 and 112.
166. Agencia Espafiola de Protection de Datos, Creacion de sistemas de denuncias internas en las empresas (mecanismos
de "whistleblowing'), May 28 2007, [hereinafter "AEPD Report"], available at https://www.agpd.es/upload/
CanalDocumentacion/Informes%20Juridicos/Otras%20cuestiones%20de%20interes/ OC%20%282007-01
28%29% 20%28Creaci%F3n%2Ode%2Osistemas%2Ode%20denuncias%20internas%20en%201as%2Oem-
presas%2C%20mecanismos%20de%20whistleblowing%29.pdf. This report was reaffirmed in dictum in a
subsequent ruling of Spain's DPA, Spanish Agencia Espaiola de Proteccion de Datos, Autorizacton transferencia
internacional de datos a Estados Unidos de Amrica, No. Expediente TI/00035/2007 (Aug. 10, 2007).
167. The company reporting system at issue let a whistleblower denounce a fellow worker either by tele-
phone or in person.
168. See Article 29 Working Party Opinion, supra note 121.
169. AEPD Report, supra note 166, at 3.
170. Id. at 6.
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2. Limit reportable infractions: Employer structures the hotline so it accepts only
denunciations for violating those rules that could get an employee disciplined or
fired. The hotline must be closed to denunciations for general ethical infractions,
workplace norms, worker grievances, and minor infractions.171 Indeed, in communi-
cating the hotline to employees, the employer must list those specific rules that, if
broken, will support a whistleblower's denunciation.172 Presumably, hotline opera-
tors must hang up on any caller trying to report a violation of an unlisted offense. 7 3
3. Reject anonymous calls (direct conflict with SOXM and preserve confidentiality:
Employer structures hotline to reject anonymous calls. In Spain, whistleblowing de-
nunciations via hotline cannot, ever, be anonymous. 174 some would-be whistleblower
uses a hotline but refuses to self-identify, the hotline operator should, presumably,
hang up; any anonymous electronic or written denunciation should, presumably, be
ignored and destroyed. 75 In this respect Spain takes the hardest-line anti-anonymity
position in Europe and stands alone as being in direct conflict with SOX.176 Addi-
tionally, employers have to keep whistleblowing reports confidential and must there-
fore withhold from a target access to information identifying his whistleblower.' 77
4. Guarantee data rights: Employer crafts a whistleblower system that balances the
company's interest in rooting out wrongdoing against the competing rights of
whistleblower targets. The whistleblowing procedure must expressly safeguard indi-
vidual rights under Spanish data law, such as data subject rights of access, rectifica-
tion, erasure, and "opposition." I7 8
5. Implement security: Employer implements security procedures, tough enough to
clear the hurdle imposed by Spanish Royal Decree 994/1999, safeguarding
whistleblower call reports, and investigation files, from disclosure and breach.179
6. Register: Employer affirmatively registers the whistleblower system with, and gets
an "inscription" on, the Spanish General Registry for Data Protection.'8 0 If hotline
171. Id. at IV.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 7. The AEPD considered the specific company's hotline regime too open-ended. According to
the AEPD, the hotline allowed reporting any "behaviors, actions or facts that may constitute a violation of
either the internal regulations of the company or the laws, regulations or ethical codes" that apply to the
company (translation by author).
174. Id. at 9.
175. See id. Ironically, a different rule (recommendation) in Spain actively encourages anonymous employee
whistleblowing. See CNMV, supra note 48. But as that law expressly defers to data protection law, it does not
override the data law doctrine discussed here. Id.
176. See svpra Part I. This supposed direct conflict between the Spanish position and SOX assumes that the
Carnero (non-extraterritoriality) analysis does not reach SOX § 301. Id. If, though, the Camero doctrine does
reach § 301, then there is no conflict here at all: Spanish hotlines cannot be anonymous, but SOX does not
require listed companies to offer anonymous hodines in Spain. See supra Part I.
177. AEPD Report, sitpra note 166, at 9.
178. Id. at 10. For detail on an employer's obligation to list whistleblower rights, see infra Part IVf()(5).
179. Id. at 9. Spain's Royal Decree 994/1999 mandates the technical and organizational security measures
that would cover the processing of electronic files that could include personal data, and establishes three
security levels: basic, medium and high. Decree Approving the Regulation on Mandatory Security Measures
(B.O.IC 1999, 151).
180. AEPD Report, supra note 166, at 9.
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calls will be answered outside the EU (or if information about denunciations will
make its way outside the EU, such as to a U.S. headquarters), then the company must
seek, and receive, affirmative permission from the AEDP. 181
7. Tell target: Once a hotline call comes in, employer tells the incriminated target, at
latest within three months of the denunciation, about the charges against him, and
briefs him about his rights under Spanish law.182
8. Purge files quickly: Employer speedily destroys whistleblower case files, consistent
with published policy. Hotline sponsors in Spain must tell workers how long the
company holds onto whistleblower case files, and then destroy files pursuant to these
self-imposed timetables. Stated file-retention periods must be as short as possible but
can be long enough to do an adequate internal investigation; at maximum, those files
subject to litigation actually in court may be kept through the pendency of
proceedings.18 3
Summary chart #3
Whistleblower hotlines and data protection law in Europe:
EU jurisdictions that have issued written guidance on hotlines and data law,
as of November 2007
Must confine A a y- Is outsourced
Is the written hotline to cer- mous (vs. in-house) Must disclose
guidance bind- tain topics whistleblower hotline hodine to data
Jurisdiction ing law? ony? calls ever ok? favored? agency?
EU Art. 29 No (opinion of Hotline OK if Yes, but do In-house hot- Depends on
Workin 1 Feb 06 per- limited to "not advertise" line is favored; local EU mem-
PAM suasive, consist- audit/account- anonymity fea- trained in- ber state law
ing of collective ing fraud and ture 184  house team
view of local bribery; no should oversee
Data Protection opinion yet on
Agency [DPA hotlines that
representatives) reach other
topics
Belgu No, but persua- Yes, to: crimi- Yes, but dis- Outsourcing is Yes
sive: DPA rec- nal offences couraged; only disfavored and
ommendation and violations for exceptional maybe not
of 29 Nov 06 of company cases allowed; need
rules and legal in-house point-
regulations person
181. Id. at 12 (explaining that "it will be necessary to notify" the AEPD and to get an "inscription" on the
"Register") (translation by the author).
182. Id. at 11.
183. ld.
184. Art. 29 Working Party Opinion, supra note 161, at 11; see also Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman, EU
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Frce Yes (local DPA Yes, to: audit/ Yes, but not Neither is Permission
guidelines of 10 accounting/ encouraged favored; if in- required under
Nov 05 and 8 financial/bank- (DPA orally said house, trained 11/10/05 guide-
Dec 05) ing fraud and on 2 Mar. 07 team should lines; self-cer-
bribery that anonymity oversee tify compliance
feature cannot only under 12/
be communi- 8/05 guidelines
cated to
employees)
Germ No (opinion of Hotline OK if Yes, but dis- Not clear; third Yes, unless there
20 Apr. 07 of limited to: couraged; only party hodine is a company
Diisseldorfer criminal, for exceptional outsourcers data officer, or
Kreis, national human rights, cases appear favored if some other
data group con- and envt'l yio- exception
sisting of col- lations; other applies
lective view of topics may be
local German OK, but hot-
L'nder [states] line may not






Ireland No (guidance No; hotline can Yes, but "not Neither is No, unless hot-
posted on local cover whatever encouraged"' 86  favored line calls to
DPA webpage, violations com- include sensi-




Luern- No (guidance Yes, to: Yes, but anony- Neither is Yes
bouri of 30 June 06, accounting, mous must be favored; trained
updated 11 audit, banking discouraged; team to handle
Oct. 07, posted and bribery whistleblowers reports recom-
on local DPA issues must identify if mended
webpage) possible
Nether- No, but persua- Yes, "limi[t]" Yes, but dis- Third-party Yes
lnds sive: local DPA scope; any call couraged; only hotline out-
recommenda- reports to "par- for exceptional sourcer is
tion to individ- ent company" cases favored
ual party of 16 can only





185. Whisdeblowing Hotlines (German advisory guidelines), supra note 154, at §B.
186. Irish Recommendation, supra note 125.
187. Dutch Recommendation, supra note 112.
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No, but persua- Yes, to: issues No (hence head- Neither is Yes, "it will be
sive: local DPA that could sub- on conflict with favored necessary to
report to indi- ject target to SOX) notify" to get
vidual party of discipline; must "inscription" in
28 May 07; specify: what DPA "Regis-
favorably cited offenses can be ter
" l s s
in DPA author- denounced;,
ization of 10 what internal
Aug 07 or external reg-
ulations the
offences violate
UK No (local DPA No, but there Yes, but "confi- Neither is Likely yes, but
conference "should be" a dential report- favored not addressed
paper of 6 Apr "clear" list of ing" is in 6 Apr 06
06) topics coy- preferred 190  paper
ered
189
J. TOPICAL CHECKLIST OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAw/HoTLINE COMPLIANCE
ISSUES
By chronologically examining the guidance from the nine EU jurisdictions that have
taken a position on the whistleblower hotline issue, we have taken an historical and geo-
graphical approach. Perhaps, though, a more practical way for a U.S.-based multinational
with pan-European operations to understand hotline law in Europe would be through a
topical approach-an inventory of the issues. Even though data protection laws differ from
one EU member state to the next and even though the various European jurisdictions
have staked out unique positions on how their data laws reach whistleblower hodines,
there is a single pool of data protection law issues 191 that spreads across the EU.192 Here
is a breakdown of those issues in the form of a doctrine-by-doctrine checklist of the EU
data law principles that a multinational must account for before launching a legally-com-
pliant SOX-style whistleblower hotline in Europe.
1. Limit Hotline Topics to Ensure "Proportionality"
We have seen that some Europeans who are skeptical of whistleblowing urge that any
workplace hotline be limited in scope, preferably contained only to reports of SOX audit/
accounting fraud and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act bribery. 93 Ireland, Spain, and U.K.
(and probably Italy, Finland, Greece, and others) are looser, but even these countries
would have employers spell out the precise infractions about which a hotline accepts de-
nunciations?and have operators hang up on any worker calling to report something
188. AEPD Report, supra note 166, at 12.
189. Whistleblowing in the U.K., supra note 112, at 4.
190. Id.
191. By "EU data protection law issues," that is to say legal issues effecting SOX-style employee
whistleblower hotlines in Europe besides scope-of-SOX and labor law/information and consultation issues, which
issues are addressed in Parts I and Im of this article.
192. Of course, as discussed throughout this, Part IV, all the EU jurisdictions have on their books sophisti-
cated data protection laws that directly affect hodines, and that come into play as regards the issues on this
checklist, even where their DPAs have not taken a formal position.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-3.
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else.' 9 4 Germany lets a hotline take reports of human rights and environmental violations
but disfavors systems that invite reporting mere "ethical" infractions.9 5 The Netherlands
wants no hodine call or hotline call data to leave Europe unless it regards issues that
transcend the Dutch subsidiary level.
196
These scope limits grow out of an elusive civil-law doctrine called "proportionality," the
least-restrictive-means principle that, as applied to employee reporting procedures, re-
quires containing a hotline tool so it gets no bigger than necessary for the precise job at
hand.i 97 Those of us from common-law jurisdictions have a hard time applying the pro-
portionality principle in practice, and our confusion is understandable: the proportionality
concept is so slippery that it gets interpreted in widely different ways across Continental
European jurisdictions. For example, in France proportionality requires closing hotlines
off to reports of non-SOX offenses like sexual harassment, but Latvia would almost cer-
tainly accept a sexual harassment hotline as proportionate with Latvian anti-harassment
law. 19s In Norway (a European Economic Area country that follows EU data rules) a
hotline is, by law, inherently proportionate even if it expressly allows whistleblowers to
* denounce their fellows merely for infringing some undefined "censurable condition." 19 9
These country-to-country inconsistencies in applying proportionality frustrate Ameri-
can hodine designers.20 0 A U.S. "best practice" (although not a SOX mandate) is to open
up hodines so a company can nip in the bud any wrongdoing, be it discrimination, harass-
ment, product tampering, misuse of intellectual property, and even time-card violations,
theft of office supplies, or flouting a no-smoking or no-alcohol rule. But in Europe, "pro-
portionality" requires restricting the universe of offenses reportable on a hotline. No U.S.
rule mandates otherwise, so multinationals need to comply.
194. See Irish Recommendation;, supra note 125; see Whistleblowing in the U.K., supra note 133; see AEPD
Report, supra note 166.
195. Whistleblowing Hodines, supra note 154.
196. Dutch Recommendation, supra note 112, at 4.
197. See, e.g., Roselyn S. Sands, Workplace Investigations in France, IBA EMPLOYMENr AN) INI>J)USTRIAL RE-
LATIONS LAW N-WSLI.-TTFR, Apr. 2008 (vol. 18 no. 1) 14, 16 (under "the proportionality principle ...
Article L 120-2 of the French Labour Code is often used by the courts to exclude evidence gathered by way
of an investigation considered to have an illegitimate purpose or to have been undertaken in an overly broad
manner").
198. As to Latvia, this is based on 2007 advice from Latvian counsel submitted to the author on a client
matter.
199. This is because a Norwegian law actually requires employers to establish procedures ("rou-
tines.. or... other measures") for the "internal notification concerning censurable conditions" in the work-
place. Norway Working Environment Act, supra note 48, § 3-6.
200. A cynical common-law lawyer, seeing the wide divergence among how countries interpret the propor-
tionality concept in fact, might accuse the civil-law systems of applying their proportionality principle in
hindsight, invoking it to bar disfavored practices not otherwise specifically illegal. For a fairly detailed analy-
sis of proportionality in the context of EU whistleblowing regulation, see, e.g., Joaquin Bayo Delgado, Deputy
European Data Protection Supervisor, Whistleblowing in the European Institutions, unpublished PowerPoint
slideshow presented to the Conference of European Data Protection Authorities, Budapest meeting, (Apr.
24-25, 2006) http://abiweb.obh.hu/dpc/springconference2006/confpapers/session3-joaquinbayodelgado.
ppt#1.
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2. Align Hotlines with "Alternate Reporting Channels"
Related to the proportionality issue is the widespread European "availability of alternate
reporting channels" objection. Europeans criticize whistleblower hotlines as a clumsy
New World sledgehammer oblivious to the carefully-balanced equilibrium of the Euro-
pean workplace. It is true that European employment relationships?as contrasted with
those under U.S.-style employment-at-will?teem with structures, committees, representa-
tives, protocols, and other avenues that an enterprising whistleblower might use (perhaps
even anonymously) to report wrongdoing in a culturally-appropriate way.201 Precisely
what these European alternate reporting channels are depends on the member state, the
company, and who is making the argument; common examples include ombudsmen, indi-
vidual worker representatives, health and safety committees, local (national and "enter-
prise") works councils, European Works Councils, trade union representatives,
government labor bureaucracies, DPAs, and even the in-house company chain-of-com-
mand. Any employer launching a hotline in Europe should indeed align it with these
alternate reporting channels, articulating a viable case for how the hotline is necessary and
proportionate standing beside them.
While the typical American reaction to the "alternate reporting channels" argument is
to counter that no existing European channel really takes the place of an American-style
SOX hotline, some multinationals might possibly consider the opposite strategy: "if you
can't beat 'em, join 'em." We have seen that SOX does not mandate high-tech telephone/
computer hotlines at all; indeed, the S.E.C. took pains to allow each employer to tailor
whatever report "procedures" work best in its unique workplace. 2° 2 A creative multina-
tional might decide?rather than try to graft a high-tech U.S. hotline onto the already-
flourishing set of European alternate reporting channels?to enlist these organic, already-
in-place channels as its designated "confidential, anonymous" Section 301 "employe[e]"
report "procedures. ' 20 3
3. Offer Whistleblower Confidentiality but Actively "Discourage" Anonymity
Both SOX and European data protection law require that employee whistleblower re-
ports be held confidentially, so there is no conflict there. The huge point of diversion, as
we have seen, regards not confidentiality but anonymity. Section 301 tells us little about
201. U.S. employment law is characterized by the unique employment-at-will doctrine. While employ-
ment-at-will often gets discussed as it regards employers' freedom to fire workers for any reason or no reason
(only not a discriminatory or retaliatory reason), in fact U.S. employment-at-will permeates day-to-day em-
ployment relations, in that it leaves American employers, for the most part, free to structure work relation-
ships however they want (subject to laws on specific topics, of course, such as workplace safety and overtime
pay). As a result, the "alternate reporting channels" of Europe are less common stateside.
202. See supra note 17. For a discussion of alternate reporting channels in the Dutch context, see supra text
accompanying notes 113 and 114.
203. SOX, supra note 5, §301. SOX of course does require "confidential, anonymous" procedures, but to
meet this confidentiality/anonymity requirement using existing European workplace channels should be no
harder (and probably easier) than by using a U.S.-style hotline. Id. After all, any employee in Europe can
drop an anonymous note to someone such as his ombudsmen, individual worker representative, health and
safety committee, local (national or "enterprise") works council representative, European Works Council
representative, trade union representative, government labor bureaucracy, DPA, or up the in-house company
chain-of-command. See supra text accompanying note 7, and infra note 272.
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how to structure whistleblowing "procedures," but it does require that whistleblowers be
allowed to stay "anonymous."2 G4 The clash first emerged in the French McDonald's and
Exide Technologies cases, where under the European/French view the SOX anonymity re-
quirement was intolerable, and hotline call operators were supposed to hang up on any
whistleblower who refused to self-identify.205
Because of the head-on collision with SOX, though, the Europeans backed off here a
bit,206 and now Spain is the only member state on record as flatly banning anonymous
hodines. 207 In other EU states, including Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and even (to a lesser extent) the U.K., hotline communications to
employees now need merely "discourage" anonymous calls.
2 0 8
But this discouragement should be genuine. In fact, France's DPA takes a uniquely-
strict interpretation of "discouragement" and has said orally that hotline communications
to employees cannot even mention anonymity. (To the French DPA, any mention that a
hotline is anonymous, even if phrased in "discourag[ing]" terms, seems unduly
suggestive).20 9
From a purely European point of view, the clear "best practice" here is to follow the
French interpretation Europe-wide and to keep hotline communications completely silent
as to the anonymity feature. But on matters of SOX compliance, few U.S.-traded mul-
tinationals seem focused on adhering to European "best practices." Fearing the S.E.C.
might see any whistleblower communication silent on anonymity as falling short of Sec-
tion 301, American audit committees may prefer to let their employees, worldwide, know
that their hotlines welcome, or at least accept, anonymous denunciations. As such, too
many existing hotline policies in Europe fall illegally short of "discouraging" anonymity as
mandated on the European side. In striking a balance here, each multinational needs to
accept that European privacy regulators understand "to discourage" as meaning more than
"not to encourage." The European principle that hotline communications discourage an-
onymity means explaining the anonymity feature in a way designed to convince employees
not to use it (and in France, even that is going too far).
4. Repeal or Get Approvals for Any Mandatory Reporting Rule in Continental Europe
A strong U.S. whistleblowing "best practice"-although not a SOX mandate for rank-
and-file employees-is for a company hotline or code of conduct to impose a mandatory
reporting rule that forces any employee who happens to witness or learn about miscon-
duct to report it.210 If nothing else, these rules give American employers leverage against
suspected wrongdoers in those circumstances where suspects can be shown to have known
of the wrongdoing but where not enough evidence otherwise implicates them as having
participated.
204. SOX supra note 5, at §301.
205. McDonald's, supra note 75; Eride Technologies, supra note 75..
206. The EU Article 29 Working Party and the French DPA, the CNIL, actually talked to the S.E.C.
Bostelman, supra note 3, §19.11.2. Perhaps the most concrete outcome of those talks was the Article 29
Party's and the CNIL's slight softening of the anonymity ban. Id.
207. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Summary Chart #3 pp 56-60.
209. See supra note 97.
210. See supra notes 18 and 58.
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Almost universally across Continental Europe, mandatory reporting rules can be de-
clared illegal under one legal theory or another. In Europe these rules incite significant
push-back from employees, their representatives, and government agencies. Multination-
als therefore have little choice but to purge mandatory reporting rules from Continental
European whistleblowing arrangements unless they can somehow get pan-European
works council and DPA buy-in, which is unlikely. Where a multinational might somehow
pull off a legal mandatory reporting rule, for example in the U.K., the wording should
emphasize that whistleblowers heeding the duty to denounce co-workers remain free to
select reporting channels other than the hotline.
5. List for Employees Their Due Process Rights upon Being Turned in by a Whistleblower
Domestically within the United States, "best practices" codes of conduct and hotline
protocols tend to focus on reserving an employer's rights as against employees. Stateside,
any code of ethics that mentions employee rights at all tends to limit them, such as the
common provision telling employees they have no expectation of privacy in office com-
puters or email, which the employer can search without notice. However, European data
protection law principles require that employers explain what data-law rights kick in when
a whistleblower turns you in.211 We can almost think of this principle as similar to the
American criminal-procedure concept of reading a suspect the Miranda rights. Not sur-
prisingly, U.S. companies' hotline communications tend to fall short here; in fact, U.S.-
drafted whistleblowing policies tend to talk so much about the whistleblower that most
seem almost to ignore the hapless target entirely. U.S.-drafted whistleblowing policies,
like the text of the SOX whistleblower provisions, almost seem implicitly to presume
targets guilty.
Specifically, in Europe, whistleblower hotline communications should outline the tar-
get's due process rights. What, exactly, these due process rights are is a matter of black-
letter EU data protection law.2 12 In the hotline-denunciation context, these due process
rights include:
" the right to be informed promptly of the denunciation
" the right to have word of the denunciation kept secure and confidential, except on
a need-to-know basis
* the right to review the investigation file and understand the charges
" the right to challenge the whistleblower's version of the facts through a dispute
resolution procedure
* the right to have the investigation file destroyed once the target gets exonerated, or
litigation ends
* the right to sue the employer, or file a DPA charge, alleging the employer violated
these rights21
3
211. See Directive, supra note 68.
212. DOWLING, JR. & MnTlAN, supra note 71, § 14:2.4.
213. See AEPD Report, sifpra note 166, at 1. To Americans, these look like U.S. criminal procedure rights.
A European might accuse Americans of being inconsistent in taking so much pride in their Constitutional Bill
of Rights guarantees of due process and presumption of innocence while ignoring these same concepts in the
domestic U.S. whistleblower hotline context. To Americans, though, this is not inconsistent at all, because
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6. Disclose Hotlines to DPAs Where Necessary and Get Any Required Permissions
As we have seen, EU member state data protection laws are aligned ("harmonized")
around a single EU data directive, but in some respects local data laws differ widely from
one member state to the next. Perhaps the topic under EU data law where the state-to-
state divergence is widest is mandatory reporting of data processing systems to local DPAs
and the need for DPA permission to process certain types of data.
The question of whether a whistleblower hotline in a given EU country must be dis-
closed to the local DPA and whether that DPA affirmatively must authorize the system is
usually a question of member state DPA procedure for employment data processing gen-
erally.214 That is, in most cases this will not be a hotline-specific question. 215 The re-
quirements vary greatly by member state. The issues here tend to be:
a. Permission
Member states where an employer cannot run a hotline until getting an affirmative
DPA dispensation include France (under one set of guidelines) and possibly, depending on
the hotline's set-up and interpretations of local rules, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden,
and others.216
b. Notification Necessary
States where hotlines merely should be notified to a DPA, without needing to get af-
firmative DPA permission, include: Belgium, France (self-certification under an alternate
set of guidelines), Germany (unless there is an in-house data officer), Italy (where notifica-
tion to a labor agency may also be required), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, U.K. (but only as part of the regular annual DPA notification filing), and others.217
c. Notification Unclear
States where notification might be necessary, but whether it is or not is currently un-
clear, include: Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, and others. 218 In these states, for the most part,
the notification issue turns on whether the hotline is seen as handling sensitive data.2 19
d. No Action Required
States where neither notification nor permission is necessary include Finland, possibly
Norway (a European Economic Area country that follows EU data law), and others.
under U.S.-style employment-at-will (as opposed to under European employment law principles), rights on
the job are not analogous to liberty under the criminal justice system. See supra notes 43 and 201.
214. See DOWLING, JR. & MrrTMAN, supra note 71, § 14.2.6.
215. As an example, even before the McDona's and Exide Technologies cases, the McDonald's and Exide
Technologies companies understood that hodines in France were subject to France's general "authorization"
procedure. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85. A survey of member state DPA notice and authoriza-
tion requirements for employer data processing is beyond the scope of this article; indeed, a thorough sum-
mary would require, at least, an entire article of its own, if not a book.
216. See supra Summary Chart #3 pp 56-60.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra Part IV0)(10).
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7. Translate Hotline Communications and Use Multilingual Operators
Multinationals increasingly designate English as their "primary language." 220 But
whatever this English-as-official-company-language designation might mean, it does not
let a company communicate about its hotline across Europe in English. Translating the
hotline communication package is critical.
A few EU jurisdictions, such as Belgium, France, and Poland, have statutes requiring
that all employee communications be in the local language. In France, one recent fine for
violating the so-called Loi Toubon workplace language law exceeded $850,000, which an
appellate court reduced from a trial-court award of about $1,600,000.221 As applied to
employee hotlines, these workplace language statutes render English-language
whistleblowing hotline communications, and codes of conduct, flatly illegal.
Even those non-English-speaking European states without language statutes of the Loi
Toubon sort essentially require local-language hotline communications, in practical effect,
on several grounds:
* Notifications of hotlines to DPAs222 will almost always have to be in the local
language.
9 A DPA could take the position that mandated hotline communications (such as
listed employee due process rights of those turned in by a whistleblower) are ineffec-
tive if in a foreign language like English. 223
a The vital information/consultation/co-determination step to implementing a hot-
line224 effectively forces translations (few works councils will consult over foreign-
language proposals). 225
* If a hotline dispute ever lands in local court, a multinational cannot expect to draw
an English-speaking judge, much less one who credits English-language employee
communications as effective.
Separately, any telephone-based hotline will obviously need operators who can field calls
from non-English-speaking emplojee populations.
8. Outsource a Hotline in Compliance with Local Rules
The outsourcing of whistleblower hotlines has sprung up as something of a mini-indus-
try, with reportedly over 100 vendors now offering hotline-response services to compa-
nies. DPAs in Germany and the Netherlands are on record as favoring the use of expert
220. Phred Dvorak, Plain English Gets Harder in Global Era, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2007, at BI, col 1. ("More
companies are adopting English as a primary language, even those, like Luxembourg-based ArcelorMittal,
which operate largely outside of English-speaking countries.")
221. See, e.g., French Workers Use Language Lan to Retain French in the Office as Firms Favour Use of English,
PersonnelToday.com, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.personneltoday.com/aricles/2007/o9/25/42428/french-
workers-use-language-law-to-retain-french-in-the-office-as-firms-favour-use-of-english.html. ("General
Electric Medical Systems.. fined Euros 580,000.. .for failing to translate company [personnel] documents
into French.") (U.S.-dollar equivalents of this well-publicized fine vary by date of conversion; these conver-
sions are from November 2007).
222. See supra Part V(J)(6).
223. See supra Part IV()(5).
224. See supra Part Im.
225. See supra Part 11.
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outsourcers, apparently because outside vendors are presumably hotline professionals who
maintain confidentiality, if only by insulating incoming whistleblowing calls from a com-
pany's internal gossip network.226
Most other EU states, however, either take no position on hotline outsourcing or ac-
tively discourage it, preferring that hotline calls be fielded in-house. The Article 29
Working Party, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg all seem to steer employers toward
appointing expert in-house local teams to oversee the hotline process. Under a strict
reading of Belgium's guidance, for example, outsourcing a hotline within the kingdom
appears illegal. 227 While outsourcing hotline calls may be convenient for multinationals,
any delegation to a vendor obviously needs to comply with applicable law.
9. Insulate Hotline Call Data Transmissions Outside the EU
A discrete problem in European hotline compliance is out-of-EU data transmissions.
Hotlines answered outside the EU, such as at U.S. headquarters or at some outsourced
vendor's stateside call center, along with hotlines answered in Europe but where call re-
ports get transmitted to a multinational's American headquarters raise the special issue of
restrictions on personal data transmissions outside the EU.22s EU data laws tightly regu-
late all transmissions of personal data outside the EU, and some hotline-specific guidance,
particularly the whistleblowing rules in Belgium and France, impose strict limits on hot-
lines answered outside Europe.229
In their marketing, many U.S. hotline vendors downplay this problem by claiming to be
"safe-harbor" certified.2 30 But any such certification is at best only a partial solution, espe-
cially if the U.S. vendor breaches its safe harbor by immediately reporting, to its cus-
tomer's U.S. headquarters, a summary of legitimate-sounding denunciation calls
received.23' Every hotline on which calls, or call data, will go outside the EU needs an
out-of-EU data transmission compliance strategy that accounts for every link in the chain
and that therefore relies on more than just a safe harbor certification internal to an outside
vendor.232
226. See Dutch Recommendation, supra note 112, at 6.
227. Belgium Recommendation, supra note 143, at 8.
228. See, e.g., DOWLING, JR. & IrMAN, supra note 71, § 14:3 (summarizing EU data protection laws
under Articles 25 and 26 of the data directive on outside-EU data transmissions and summarizing compliance
tools such as safe harbor, model contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, and valid consents).
229. Directive, supra note 68.
230. See DOWLING, JR. & MrTTmAN, supra note 71, § 14:3.2 (description of safe harbor).
231. At least one hotline call vendor/outsourcer, Wackenhut, offers a call center on EU soil, in Belgium.
Wackenhut Ethics and Compliance Services: Safe2Say Ethics and Compliance Hotline, http://www.ci-wack-
enhut.com/S2S%2oCompliance%2OHotline.htm. If a U.S. multinational uses a European-answered service
like Wackenhut's, and if the outsourcer reports on incoming calls to an EU, as opposed to U.S., client con-
tact, then this outside-EU data transmission problem drops out completely, unless, that is, the client company
itself transmits call data received from the EU hotline outsourcer back to U.S. headquarters without an on-
point safe harbor, model contract, or binding corporate rules of its own. See supra note 100.
232. See DOWLING, JR. & MrTrzMAN, supra note 71; Wackenhut, supra note 235. While this outside-EU
data transmission compliance issue is important as to international hotines, U.S. multinationals need to keep
it in context. Extraterritorial hotline data transmission is just a discrete sub-issue within the much bigger EU
data privacy law compliance challenge. Compare this "Insulate hotline call data transmissions outside the EU"
bullet with the other bullets on this checklist. Marketing materials from hotiine vendors (call center out-
sourcers) often stress the vendor's safe-harbor certification. Multinational customers of these vendors need to
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10. Take a Position on "Sensitive" Data
The question of how hotlines process so-called "sensitive" data is the "sleeping giant" in
European whistleblowing, especially in the eighteen EU member states whose DPAs have
not yet issued hotline-specific guidance.233 Every employer operating a hotline in Europe
needs a cohesive strategy for the "sensitive" data issue.
Under the EU data directive, a special class of personal information, commonly called
"sensitive" data, cannot be "processed" at all unless the "data subject," which in the hot-
line context means the accused wrongdoer whom a whistleblower turned in, had previ-
ously "freely given" an "unambiguous" consent (although in Europe, employment-context
consents might be deemed per se coerced) or unless the applicable DPA had previously
issued an express authorization. 234
"Sensitive" data, by definition, means information involving "racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership ... health or
sex life," or "offences, criminal convictions, or security measures." 235 While a hotline call
might conceivably involve any of these categories, the "offences... or security measures"
piece of the definition creates a particular problem.2 36 If a hotline is a data-processing
system designed to elicit records or notes about possible "offences" or breaches in "secur-
ity measures," then a hotline could be per se illegal unless whistleblowers' potential targets
had first "freely" and "unambiguous[ly]" consented to being denounced, or unless the
applicable DPA had first given a special dispensation.2 37
This restriction raises a difficult hotline problem in those EU member states whose
DPAs have not yet specifically addressed the hotline issue and is probably a major hurdle,
for example, in Denmark, Greece, Slovakia, and Sweden, among others. Plus, even some
of those DPAs that have issued hotline guidance, such as the Irish DPA, expressly see the
"sensitive" character of hotline data as a special problem. The issue is especially acute as
to data transmitted out of the EU. In Ireland and Slovakia, for example, hotline data
could be held "sensitive" data and as such, under local data law, subject to prior DPA
authorization for transmission abroad.23 8 That is, a hotline answered in the United States,
as well as a locally-answered hotline whose reports get transmitted to a U.S. headquarters,
would appear to be illegal absent a prior DPA-issued affirmative dispensation or other
applicable exception.
There is, however, another view. Under data-law jurisprudence in Spain, and perhaps
elsewhere, "sensitive" criminal data in the hotline context might turn out to be mostly a
non-issue. Under that theory, the criminal data that count as "sensitive" under the direc-
tive's definition only regard information about past arrests or convictions tracked in the
understand that any such safe harbor certification is, at best, just one step on the path to EU hotline data law
compliance.
233. There are twenty-seven EU member states; of them, as of the end of October 2007, nine had issued
some form of hotline-specific guidance (discussed supra Parts IV(A)-(l)), so eighteen had not, although gui-
dance from Finland was expected by the end of 2007. See supra Part IV.
234. Directive, supra note 68, at art. 8.
235. Id. at arts. 8(1) and (5).
236. Id. at art 8(5).
237. Id.
238. See supra Part 4(D).
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criminal justice system, as opposed to information about present misdeeds that might later
be labeled an offense or a crime. 239
11. Secure Hotline Data
EU data protection laws require maintaining tight security over personal data.24° In the
hotline context this security mandate translates into an affirmative duty to protect from
breach all files on whistleblower reports and internal investigations. But the actual steps
that the security requirement imposes depend on the member state: Data laws in some EU
jurisdictions offer only vague statements about appropriate "technical and organizational
measures" for securing data.241 In EU states like Italy and Spain, however, detailed data
security regulations, although not specific to hotlines, exist and unquestionably reach hot-
lines.2 4 2 The nine EU jurisdictions that did issue hodine-specific data law guidance kept
mostly silent on how they expect multinationals to secure hotline data,2 43 but it is clear
that local laws require adequate data security.
12. Keep Internal Investigations Compliant
When hotline reports come in, reasonable employers do not take them at face value;
employers investigate. Unfortunately, a U.S.-style "best practices" internal investigation
is flatly illegal in Europe. As such, no legally-compliant multinational should ever unleash
an expert American internal investigator on a European whistleblower denunciation with-
out ensuring the investigation will preserve all the due process rights the multinational
already should have extended to the European whistleblower's target.244 This requires
concessions so tough that, to a U.S. company, they border on the intolerable. Two
examples:
In many cases stateside an internal investigator will, quite logically, keep the target of an
investigation in the dark as long as possible so as to preserve evidence and perhaps to catch
the wrongdoer in the act. European rules, however, generally require telling the target
about the accusation immediately after securing the evidence.2 45
239. Every EU member state has a unique local law "transposing" (adopting) the EU data directive. Direc-
tive, supra note 68. At the level of analysis we are into at this point, we need to look at the local-language text
of each member state's data law, to parse the phrasing of the "criminal" data component within its definition
of "sensitive" data: Does the local data statute seem to refer broadly to information about security and crimes?
Or does it seem to refer to arrest and conviction records in the criminal justice system?
240. Id. at art. 8.
241. Id. at Recitals (46).
242. Data security guidelines of Italian DPA of Nov. 23, 2006; Spanish Royal Decree, supra note 177. In
UK, a "best practice," but not a statutory mandate, is for employer whistleblowing procedures and other
data handling to follow British Standard on Information Security Management Info. Sec. Mgmt. Syst. 3
(2006).
243. That is, other than the requirement of appointing in-house expert custodians of the hotline process and
the requirement to destroy hotline data promptly (both of these requirements are addressed elsewhere on this
checklist, and are not treated here as strictly data security isses).
244. See supra Part IV(J)(5); see also Corus, supra note 137.
245. Most discussions of the duty to tell the target immediately envision telling him as soon as the hotline
call comes in, or at latest as soon as the employer can secure evidence, presumably in a week or so. However,
Spain's rules, although they speak in terms of fast notification, give a drop-dead notification deadline of a full
three months. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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U.S. companies almost invariably keep their domestic U.S. internal investigation files
under cloak of attorney/client privilege. But in Europe, a target enjoys an express legal
right to see virtually all information gathered about him (redacted to preserve confidenti-
ality)?and a right to contest it. 246 Therefore, any multinational launching an internal
investigation of a European employee might have to assume the investigation files will not
be privileged.2 47
13. Destroy the File Promptly
In the United States we have a network of document retention laws that can make
destroying important information, in many circumstances, illegal. EU data protection
law, on the other hand, requires almost the exact opposite: actively destroying personal
data as soon as they become obsolete. Some of the specific recommendations from those
eight EU DPAs that have issued hotline-specific guidance call for the prompt destruction
of whistleblower reports and internal investigation files about them, often within two
months after the earlier of when a target gets exonerated or when any court proceedings
wind up. This mandate clashes with every instinct of a "best practices" American internal
investigator. Litigation-defense-minded multinationals will feel extremely reluctant to
destroy their hotline-call and internal-investigation files so quickly, especially before stat-
utes of limitations and audit periods run. But rapid file destruction, which may not con-
travene SOX if the matter has actually ended, is an important part of Europe-side legal
compliance.
V. Five Strategy Approaches Toward a Europe-Compliant Global SOX
Whistleblower Hotline
A publicly-traded multinational operating in Europe that takes seriously its Section
301-mandated duty to set up a "confidential, anonymous" whistleblower "procedure" ob-
viously needs a worldwide strategy for complying with SOX, on the one hand, and with
European labor and data privacy law on the other. 248 Multinationals therefore want to
246. For a list of most of the due process rights that the target of a whistleblower investigation enjoys in the
EU, see supra Part V(j)(5).
247. Internal investigations files in Europe are not likely privileged because the target of the investigation
has an express right under data law to see them (redacted for confidentiality). As such, on this issue-attor-
ney/client privilege in internal investigations of individuals-a gulf separates the United States from Europe.
But this is a mere difference in laws, not necessarily an irreconcilable inconsistency, because even under U.S.
principles, the attorney/client privilege does not necessarily extend to all internal investigation files, and is
always waivable.
248. Our global strategy discussion addresses only U.S. law under SOX § 301 plus the European laws affect-
ing hotlines discussed supra Parts M and IV. Our strategy discussion, therefore, lumps together Africa, Asia/
Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East, broadly assuming these regions have no laws that significantly
restrict workplace whistleblower hotlines. See supra note 4. This is because, as of early 2008, for the most
part they do not. Nevertheless, in some non-EU countries a hotline might in theory trigger legal issues?for
example, mandatory subject of bargaiining duties analogous to the discussion supra Part 1I. Also, Macedonia,
Argentina, Russia, Switzerland, and a handful of European countries outside the European Economic Area
have data protection laws modeled on the EU directive that could be subject to the EU interpretations
discussed supra Part IV. Otherwise, though, there seem to be few legal restrictions specific to workplace
hotlines outside of Europe, even (for the most part) in those countries with robust, but non-EU-modeled,
data privacy laws, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong. But this is a broad generalization. Any
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know: What is the "best practice" for setting up a global whistleblower hotline that com-
plies with the European restraints? Unfortunately there is no easy answer. There are so
many issues of law involved here in so many countries, there are so many strategic and
factual nuances, and each individual company's compliance approach (and risk tolerance)
plays so big a role, that there is simply no one-size-fits-all strategy.
As such, each multinational wrestling with the whistleblower-hodine-in-Europe issue
needs to assess its own European employee population distribution, its own current (and
proposed) whistleblower hotline procedures/strategies/communications, and its own com-
pliance approach and risk tolerance-and then tailor for itself its own strategy. The good
news is that while there may not be any one-size-fits-all solution, speaking broadly some
solution is indeed possible.249 In fact there would appear to be five possible templates for
a bespoke solution, although not all five are equally viable. Here is a summary of the five
possible framework approaches that a multinational's tailored strategy for EU hotline
compliance might follow.
A. STRATEGY APPROACH #1/No EU HOTLiNE: INVOKE CARNERO AND SHUT DowN
THE HOTLINE IN CoNTrNErTAL EUROPE OR MOLD IT COMPLETELY TO
EUROPEAN RULES
A theoretical legal strategy, albeit one especially unattractive to U.S.-based multination-
als, is to take the legal position that the Carnero non-extraterritoriality rule under SOX
Section 806 also applies to SOX Section 301; that is, to decide that SOX does not mandate
hotlines abroad at all, particularly where local laws discourage them.250 Taking this posi-
tion would leave a multinational free to shut down its hotline completely in Europe and
elsewhere outside the United States-or else to launch organic European report proce-
dures molded to all the applicable EU mores and rules without concern for SOX's "ano-
nym[ity]" mandate.
This strategy appears completely unappealing to U.S.-based multinationals, perhaps be-
cause the S.E.C. did not originally seem to buy into it251 (and hence if this theory were to
prevail as settled law, it might win out only after a federal court dismissed an S.E.C.
challenge, and no company wants to be the test case). Another reason this strategy might
be so unappealing to U.S. multinationals is that, perhaps, corporate America now accepts
the hotline as a vital tool. Many U.S. businesses now see whistleblower hotlines less as a
SOX-imposed burden than as a critical piece to a "best practices" corporate social respon-
sibility program. To shut down whistleblower hotlines in Europe could leave some Amer-
ican companies feeling, to that extent, naked. 252
careful, compliance-focused multinational should check law in each affected jurisdiction before launching any
new global workplace initiative.
249. See generally Starr, supra note 1, at 9, col.3 ( "Yes, Virginia, it is possible to develop a whistleblower
program that complies both with SOX and also EU data-protection law, but it is not easy.").
250. See supra Part I; see also supra note 27 (extraterritoriality is less appropriate where U.S. doctrine has
"unintended clashes" with foreign law, which, as we have seen, is the case in the SOX hotline context).
251. The S.E.C. does not seem to have taken a precise position on the extraterritorial reach of SOX § 301.
An early, pre-Carnero S.E.C. statement seems to imply that the S.E.C. assumed § 301 does reach overseas.
See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 36.
252. However, even if multinationals are unlikely to invoke the Carnero approach and completely disregard
SOX's hotline mandate in Europe, it may be wise to keep the Carnero arrow in a company's quiver. That is to
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B. STRATEGY APPROACH #2/ONE GLOBAL HOTLINE: LAUNCH, WORLDWIDE, A
SINGLE HOTLINE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY COMPLIES WITH BOTH
HOTLINE LAW IN EUROPE AND SECTION 301.
Many multinationals have a keen interest in offering their employees worldwide a single
global hotline, spelled out in a single global code of conduct. To launch and maintain
separate whistleblower hotlines in separate countries with separate rules and separate em-
ployee communication packages presents operational and philosophical hurdles that many
multinationals strive to avoid-even though almost all of these same businesses actively
propagate fragmented and purely-local policies, one per country, on many other topics,
including office hours, holiday/vacation/leave, overtime rules, pay scales, retirement plans,
payroll processes, collective labor strategies, and many more.
The good news is that it is indeed perfectly possible for a multinational to create a
single global253 hotline package that complies simultaneously with Section 301 and with
every hotline rule across Europe 25 4 (with the exception of whistleblower anonymity in
Spain). 255 The bad news is that few if any U.S. multinationals have taken this path be-
cause it is so impractical in that it lets the Europe "tail" wag the U.S.-and-rest-of-the-
world "dog."256
Crafting a global hotline protocol/communication/code of conduct package that carries
all the European "baggage" ends up taking on, from a U.S. point of view, so much excess
weight that, as rolled out in the United States, it becomes inconsistent with American
"best practices" and, even if technically compliant with Section 301, unworkable in prac-
tice. Any such Europe-compliant single global hotline would have to, for example:
* discourage anonymity
* limit reportable offenses
* defer to alternate reporting channels
* make whistleblowing optional (delete mandatory reporting rules)
* notify targets of their due process rights
* rein in internal investigations of whistleblower reports
say, structuring a U.S. SOX hotline to make it workable in Europe will require compromises, and some of
these compromises may raise SOX compliance questions. A multinational that accommodates a European
rule perhaps at the expense of strict SOX § 301 compliance should keep in mind that, if ever challenged by
SOX enforcers, Camrero non-extraterritoriality will be available as one defense. See generally supra note 37.
253. As to the analysis in Asia/Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East, see supra note 252.
254. We are discussing here the structuring of the hotline and the drafting of the hotline protocol and
employee communication package, not the hotline launch. Launching a global hotline will inevitably require,
in Europe, adhering to local procedural requirements in each country, chiefly including local translations,
worker consultations, and making filings with (sometimes getting affirmative permissions from) local DPAs.
See supra Part IVG).
255. Spain flatly prohibits anonymous hotlines, supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text, while SOX man-
dates anonymity in hotlines, supra Part I; so if we reject the Carnero non-extraterritoriality analysis, mpra Part
I, SOX § 301 is irreconcilable with the current hotline position of Spain's DPA.
256. Actually, quite a few multinationals currently do seem to have single global hotlines in place across
their operations worldwide. But those single hotline systems tend to violate the European rules discussed in
this article, sometimes flagrantly. In this section we are discussing single global hotlines that simultaneously
comply with SOX § 301 and with the European rules. As of early 2008 there would seem to be very few such
compliant single-hodine systems actually in place globally, including across Europe, although there may be
some in place within multinationals that operate in just one or two European states.
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• grant denounced targets access to their investigation files, thereby likely waiving
attorney/client privilege257
On U.S. soil, a hotline that clears all those hurdles may well comply with Section
301,258 but it would be seen as unduly restrictive and contrary to U.S. "best practices." As
such, although the concept of a single globally-compliant hotline package is extremely
appealing to U.S. multinationals, the reality of what such a hodine must entail rarely is.
Few multinationals will select this approach.2S9
C. STRATEGY APPROACH #3/Two HoTLINEs: LAUNCH TWO HOTLINES, ONE FOR
EUROPE THAT COMPLIES wITH BOTH SOX AND EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES,
AND ONE AMERICAN-STYLE HOTLINE FOR OPERATIONS ACROSS
THE REST OF THE WORLD
A third strategy approach is for a multinational to keep its U.S. best-practices American
hotline intact, launching it across company operations in the United States and around the
world,260 except for Europe. Separately, the multinational would craft a second, very dif-
ferent reporting system compliant with both SOX and all the European rules (one that
looks just like the single global hotline discussed in Strategy Approach #2), and would roll
out that one only across Europe. 261
This two-hotline approach strays from so many multinationals' aspiration of a single
global hotline in a single global code of conduct, 262 but it comes as close to one hotline as
is mathematically possible. For many U.S.-based multinationals, this will be the most
attractive, or the least unattractive, of the five possible strategy approaches. Indeed, as of
early 2008, this approach seemed to be emerging as a global "best practice" for those
SOX-regulated multinationals with extensive operations across Europe.
D. STRATEGY APPROACH #4/TAILORED HOTLINES: CRAFT A SINGLE HOTLINE
TEMPLATE, THEN TAILOR IT TO EACH LOCAL JURISDICTION THAT
IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS
A more refined step beyond the two-global-hotlines approach is for a multinational first
to draft its preferred, SOX-compliant hotline package and then launch that version across
257. These European-imposed restrictions on hotlines, and others, are explained in the checklist supra Part
IV().
258. The S.E.C. has expressly delegated to individual audit committees substantial autonomy on how to
design their report "procedures," and although the "procedures" have to be "anonymous," the S.E.C. does
not mandate anything specific regarding employee hotline communications, and as such would not seem to
prohibit audit committees from "discouraging" anonymity where required by local law. See supra note 17.
259. That is not to say that few multinationals have single global hotline systems; many do. Few of those
single global hodines, however, comply with the rules across Europe. See supra note 260.
260. As to the analysis in Africa, Asia/Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East, see supra note 252.
261. We are discussing here the structuring of the two hotlines and the drafting of the two hotline protocols
and employee communication packages. Separately, the launch of the European hotline across Europe would
have to comply with individual member state procedural requirements. See supra note 262.
262. This common aspiration is discussed in the text supra, Strategy Approach #2.
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the United States and all countries outside the EU that impose no hotline restrictions.2 63
Next, for Europe, the multinational would treat that ideal hotline package as a mere tem-
plate and tailor it in each member state to conform to each state's unique local labor and
data laws.
On the down side, of course, for businesses operating widely across Europe: This would
stray from an aligned and streamlined one-company approach and force, instead, a clumsy
patchwork of inconsistent hotlines. But while less than ideal, a patchwork of local hotines
should not inconvenience a multinational any more than its existing country-to-country
patchwork of local office hours, holiday/vacation/leave policies, overtime rules, pay scales,
retirement plans, payroll processes, collective labor strategies, and other self-imposed lo-
cal human resources offerings.
On the up side, this tailored-hotline strategy approach offers two important advantages.
First, it lets multinationals model hotlines in each EU jurisdiction that comply even with
the local quirks-a big compliance step toward pleasing local labor and data law enforcers.
Second, it lets a company relax hotline restrictions in those EU states where the local rules
are looser. After all, why launch a French-compliant hotline in the U.K., where
whistleblowing is so much less of an issue to the local DPA and local employment
tribunals?264
E. STRATEGY APPROACH #5/iNFoRMAL REPORT "PROCEDURES" iN EUROPE: FALL
BACK ON A Low-TECH, Low-KEY, UNDER-THE-RADAR "REPORTING
PROCEDURE" IN THE EU
The final strategy approach for simultaneously complying with Section 301 and EU
laws on hotlines differs philosophically from the other approaches and is rooted in the
loose soil of Section 301's concept of report "procedures." Semantically, it would be fair
to label any "procedur[e] for the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints" (a phrase
out of Section 301) as a "hotline." But within the universe of "hodines" we might distin-
guish a cutting-edge, all-bells-and-whistles telephone/computer system (perhaps out-
sourced to a specialist vendor) on the one hand, versus, on the other, a bare-bones, low-
tech "complain[t]" "procedur[e]" as simple as company contact information dropped into
a global code of conduct or posted somewhere on a global company intranet, intended for
the "confidential, anonymous submission by employees...of concerns" 265 (also a SOX
Section 301 phrase).
One creative global hotline approach that might sidestep-as opposed to clear-many
of the European legal hurdles discussed in this article could be for a multinational's head-
quarters, as distinct from its individual European subsidiaries, to publish to all employees
worldwide a clause in some global employee communication offering contact information
where "employees" could, using the "procedur[e]" of writing an anonymous letter, send-
263. As to the analysis in Africa, Asia/Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East, see stipra note 252.
264. Compare supra Parts m and IV(A), with supra Part V(E).
265. SOX § 301(m)(4).
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ing a fax or email from a public place, or dialing a payphone," submi[t]" a "confidential,
anonymous" "concer[n] regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters."266
Publishing this contact information, coupled with perhaps some mention of reporting,
would by definition have to comply with Section 301, after all, even the S.E.C. wants
Section 301 "procedures" to remain "flexibl[e]," and believes the "procedures" need not
be high-tech outsourced call centers. 267 Of course, any multinational doing this could
supplement its low-tech European "procedures," in the United States and elsewhere
outside Europe, 268 with an all-bells-and-whistdes telephone/computerized/outsourced
hotline.
A twist on this approach would be to formally designate, on an EU country-by-county
basis, some "alternate reporting channel" that is already up and running in each respective
European workplace as the single local Section 301 channel "procedure" to receive anony-
mous complaints. 269
Of course, this solution is not perfect. One drawback is that U.S. multinationals these
days see full-blown hodines as state-of-the-art tools for nipping wrongdoing in the bud,
and so would view this informal-report-procedures approach as a step backward for cor-
porate social responsibility. Another drawback is that while this approach is designed to
sidestep the onerous labor and data laws in Europe that reach full-blown hodines, Euro-
pean employees and enforcers who learn about a multinational headquarters publishing
contact information for reports could interpret local data and hotline law so as to reach
even that low-key publication (although the informal-report-procedures approach would
seem much less of a red-flag, to EU employees and enforcers, than a full-blown U.S. "best
practices" hodine). That is to say, while the informal-report-procedures approach might
sidestep European hurdles to hotlines, it probably does not clear all of them. To that extent,
this strategy might not be consistent with a "full compliance" approach.
VI. Conclusion
Among all its complex and burdensome provisions, SOX gives audit committees of
listed companies a straightforward direction to offer what are colloquially called
whistleblower hotlines (in Section 301 jargon, "confidential, anonymous" "procedures"
for the "submission" of "employe[e]" "complaints" and "concerns" about "questionable
accounting or auditing matters"). Under one theory the Section 301 hotline mandate
might not even reach employee populations outside the United States, but few multina-
266. SOX § 301, supra note 5. If the contact information were at U.S. headquarters or elsewhere outside of
the EU, the multinational would need a strategy for inviting cross-border personal data transmissions. See
supra Part IVJ)(9)-(10).
267. See supra note 17.
268. As to the analysis in Africa, Asia/Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East, see supra note 252.
269. "Alternate reporting channels" are discussed supra Part IV(J)(2). To designate some existing European
"alternate reporting channel" as a SOX § 301 "procedure" would require clearing the SOX "confidential,
anonymous" hurdle, which could be a challenge from a European legal perspective, but which of course
would not be any problem whatsoever from a practical perspective: It is difficult to imagine a workplace (even
one without inter-office mail) where an employee could not figure out how to get an anonymous note to a co-
worker. As such, to the extent anonymity is an issue as to "alternate reporting channels," it would seem to be
a communication issue?not an issue of anonymity in fact. See supra note 203; see generally supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
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tionals dare make that argument.270 Rather, most multinationals prefer to launch U.S.-
style "best practices" whistleblower hotlines across their worldwide operations, both to
comply with SOX and to offer a cutting-edge corporate governance/corporate social re-
sponsibility tool.
SOX's hotline mandate, simple as it seems, strikes hard against European culture,
sparking a surprisingly-visceral sociological reaction as to European whistleblowers' de-
nunciations of their fellow workers.27' As a result (and speaking from a purely U.S. per-
spective), European labor court judges27 and data protection agencies 273 might seem
almost to have seized upon existing European legal principles to obstruct American-style
SOX hotlines. Complicating the problem is the patchwork of confoundingly-inconsistent
legal positions that has recently sprung up across Europe.274 By late 2007 we had an EU
advisory position specific to workplace whistleblower hotlines plus labor law cases and
data law guidance from eight member states, but no two jurisdictions took exactly the
same position.275
In theory, in every case (except one)276 a compliance-driven U.S. multinational could
conceivably reconcile each European hotline rule with the text of SOX § 301. But any
multinational intent on making this reconciliation and crafting a compliant pan-European
whistleblower hotline finds that the chore requires deviating significantly from U.S. hot-
line "best practices"-and is made yet tougher because of the many disparate mandates
among the EU states.
There are five possible framework approaches that a U.S.-based multinational might
take to make this reconciliation and craft a hotline simultaneously compliant with SOX
and with the myriad European laws. 277 Inevitably, whichever of the five approaches a
compliance-focused multinational selects will require compromises. Yet the effort will be
worth it-if only because not making the effort means likely breaking some laws in this
vital, if narrow, branch of corporate social responsibility.
270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra Part II.
272. See supra Part m.
273. See supra Part IV.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. This refers to the fact that Spain outlaws anonymous hottines, which SOX mandates. Compare supra
text accompanying notes 175-77, with supra Part I. See supra note 259.
277. See supra Part V.
SPRING 2008

